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Since 2002, $39 billion and $46.7 billion have been appropriated to Afghanistan 
and Iraq for reconstruction spending. The dollar amounts suggest that reconstruction is 
important in post-conflict environments, but how important is it really? Some military 
commanders have interestingly noticed a relationship between the insurgency and 
reconstruction spending, specifically with the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP). In post-conflict environments, CERP reconstruction efforts can be 
applied in such a manner that they contribute to the diffusion of the incubation and 
growth of insurgencies. 
This research is focused on determining how the CERP program can be used to 
influence insurgency through a Social Movement Theoretical framework. There are two 
primary purposes: to determine if CERP has historically influenced the security 
environment in any measureable way and to develop a model comprised of those 
components (needs, deserve and message resonance) that could plausibly be argued to 
have an effect on violence and determine which components most significantly influence 
insurgency. The model is tested on the At Tameem province of Iraq. 
The results depict that commanders have not used CERP to influence the 
insurgency in Iraq, but there does exist a weak positive correlation. Further, when 
compared to historical data, the deserve and message resonance factors contribute more 
to the influence of popular support than do the needs of the people. Several prescriptive 
implications are drawn with regard to the future use of CERP. 
vi 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.................................................................................3 
B. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
1. Dependent Variable .............................................................................4 
2. Independent Variables.........................................................................5 
a. IV1: Project Characteristics .....................................................5 
b. IV2: Message Resonance..........................................................6 
3. Analysis and Testing............................................................................7 
C. SUMMARIZED FINDINGS...........................................................................8 
D. STRUCTURE...................................................................................................8 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...........................................................................11 
A. RECONSTRUCTION AND STATE LEGITIMACY................................12 
B. BACKGROUND ON CURRENT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS......16 
C. STATE OF THE LITERATURE.................................................................20 
1. Counterinsurgency Literature..........................................................21 
2. Reconstruction Literature.................................................................21 
a. The Purpose of Post-conflict Reconstruction ........................22 
b. The Prioritization of Reconstruction Efforts .........................23 
c. The Relationship between Security and Reconstruction.......24 
D. THEORY ........................................................................................................27 
E. ARGUMENT..................................................................................................30 
1. The Model ...........................................................................................31 
2.  IV1: CERP Project Characteristics ................................................31 
a. IV1.1: Needs ............................................................................31 
b. IV1.2: Deserves .......................................................................33 
3. IV2: Message Resonance ...................................................................37 
F. METHODOLOGY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS STUDY............39 
III: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CERP RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS......41 
A. A NOTE ON CERP .......................................................................................42 
B. THE PRIORITIZATION OF NEEDS.........................................................44 
1. Assessment of Needs (An) ..................................................................45 
2. The Value of Needs (Tn) ....................................................................47 
3. Summary of Needs Components.......................................................49 
C. THE DESERVE COMPONENT..................................................................50 
1. Sub-Components of the Deserve Component..................................53 
a. Actions .....................................................................................53 
b. Attitudes...................................................................................57 
2. Summary of Deserve Component.....................................................60 
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................61 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE MESSAGE IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION63 
viii 
 
A. THE OPPORTUNITY: HOW DOES THE RECONSTRUCTION 
MESSAGE CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?........................63 
1. Incentive/Inducements.......................................................................65 
2. Message Validity ................................................................................66 
B. THE TARGET AUDIENCE.........................................................................66 
C. MESSAGE EFFECTIVENESS ACCORDING TO SMT .........................68 
D. QUANTIFYING MESSAGE RESONANCE..............................................69 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................71 
V. CASE STUDY ............................................................................................................73 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................73 
B. PURPOSE AND DESIGN.............................................................................74 
C. DATA AND SOURCES.................................................................................75 
1. DV Datasets ........................................................................................75 
2. IV1 Datasets........................................................................................76 
3. IV2 Datasets........................................................................................77 
D. SAMPLING....................................................................................................78 
E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS .....................................................79 
1. General Analysis of All 695 At Tameem Villages ...........................80 
2. Comparative Analysis of 168 Sampled Villages..............................81 
3. Spatio-Temporal Analysis of 168 Assessed Villages .......................82 
4. Establishment of the DVs: CERP Money to Violence Ratios ........84 
F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS .................................................85 
1. IV1: Project Characteristics .............................................................85 
2. IV2: Message Resonance ...................................................................86 
G. KEY FINDINGS ............................................................................................89 
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................91 
A. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS ...............................................................92 
B. IMPLICATIONS ...........................................................................................92 
1. Variable Implications ........................................................................93 
2. Security Implications .........................................................................94 
3. Financial Implications .......................................................................95 
4. Implications on the Utility of This Research in Other Conflicts ...97 
5. Implications for Broader Reconstruction Funds ............................98 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................98 
1. Policy for the Use of CERP ...............................................................98 
2. Area of Operations Expertise ...........................................................99 
a. Village Assessments ................................................................99 
b. Area of Operations Expertise Summary ..............................102 
3. Data Collection and Maintenance ..................................................103 
4. Future Considerations for the CERP Program ............................103 
D. POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH...........................................104 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................105 
APPENDIX A. ......................................................................................................................107 
ix 
 
APPENDIX B:  DV/IV DIAGRAMS .................................................................................112 
I. PROVINCIAL MAP....................................................................................112 
II. DV REGRESSION WITH CORRELATION...........................................113 
III. SAMPLED VILLAGES ..............................................................................114 
IV. SAMPLE SET REGRESSION AND CORRELATION ..........................115 
V. SPATIO-TEMPORAL SCREENSHOTS..................................................116 
VI. NEEDS DATABASE ...................................................................................119 
VII. DESERVE DATABASE..............................................................................120 
VIII. POPULATION DENSITY MAP................................................................121 
IX. VILLAGE DENSITY MAP ........................................................................122 
X. AT TAMEEM MEDIA FOOTPRINT.......................................................123 
XI. MEDIA SPREADSHEET ...........................................................................124 
APPENDIX C: RESULTS ..................................................................................................125 
I. FINAL REGRESSION OUTPUT ..............................................................125 
II. PRIORITIZATION LIST...........................................................................126 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................127 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs .........................................................................15 
Figure 2.2. A Systematic Look at SMT..............................................................................28 
Figure 2.3. Argument .........................................................................................................31 
Figure 2.4. Example Weighted Priority of Needs for Kirkuk Iraqis ..................................32 
Figure 2.5. The Spectrum of Popular Support and Area of Focus for CERP 
Reconstruction .................................................................................................34 
Figure 2.6. Target Populations for Message Resonance ....................................................37 
Figure 3.1. Sample of Village Assessment Form...............................................................46 
Figure 2.5. The Spectrum of Popular Support and Area of Focus for CERP 
Reconstruction. ................................................................................................52 
Figure 3.2. Graphical Depiction of Normalization Process ...............................................56 
Figure 3.3. Graphical Depiction of the AT Normalization Process ....................................59 
Figure 5.1. Map of Iraq and subset Northern Kurdish Region...........................................74 
Figure 5.2. SIGACTs Greater than five kilometers from Assessed Villages.....................79 
Figure 5.3. Scatter-plot of Violent Acts per CERP $ Spent in At Tameem.......................80 
Figure 5.4. Violent Acts per $ CERP for 168 Sampled Villages .......................................81 
Figure 5.5. # SIGACTs vs. # CERP Reconstruction Projects by Day in At Tameem .......82 
Figure 5.6. Histogram of SIGACTs and CERP projects from 2004 to 2007  in At 
Tameem............................................................................................................83 
Figure 5.7. Population Density Values by Village.............................................................87 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAT Attitudinal indicator of the local perception of the abilities of the 
indigenous Army  
AC Actions component of the Deserve variable 
AT Attitude component of the Deserve variable 
BAC Action indicator of the density of “bad guys” per geographic area 
BSB Brigade Support Battalion 
CAT Attitudinal indicator of the local perception of the criminal justice 
system 
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
CMO Civil Military Operations 
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 
DTG Date Time Group 
DV Dependent Variable 
FRAGO Fragmentary Order 
GAT Attitudinal indicator of the local perception of the indigenous 
government 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
HVI High Value Individual 
I-CERP Iraqi Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
IDP Internally Displaced Person 
IO Information Operations 
IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System 
IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 
xiv 
 
IV Independent Variable 
JCC Joint Coordination Center 
LOO Line Of Operation 
OMA Operation and Maintenance Account 
PAT Attitudinal indicator of the local perception of the abilities of the police 
SAC Action indicator of the density of significant actions per geographic area 
SIGACT Significant Action 
SMT Social Movement Theory 
SWEAT/IR Sewer, Water, Electric, Academics, Trash / Infrastructure 
Reconnaissance  
TAC Action indicator of the density of Tips or reporting suspicious activity 
by locals  




I would first and most importantly like to thank my wife, Liz, for her countless 
hours (both day and night) of support, the time she spent entertaining the kids and 
changing diapers during my many weeks at the library. She is no doubt my motivation 
and provided me the spirit to stay on top of successful completion. There is no way I 
could have finished (or even started) this thesis without her support. I also wish to thank 
my little girls, Isabella and Kaitlyn. Bella’s concern that daddy was going to school to 
“get smarter” helped motivate me to finish. While Kaitlyn was too young to know what I 
was doing, her constant overwhelming happiness inspired me to finish strong.  
I would like to thank MAJ Zeyad Junaid Omar of 15th Brigade, 12th Division of 
the Iraqi Army. We began work together on the idea of a needs vs. deserve relationship in 
2006. He collected and sent me the hard copy village assessments that were the 
cornerstone of this research, and provided me immeasurable insight and perspective 
throughout the process.  
Kristen Tsolis also deserves recognition. The complexities of ArcGIS constantly 
forced me to ask for assistance. The grandiose ideas I had were often met by raised 
eyebrows, but she always said she would figure out a way. 
Finally, I wish to thank my advisors, Robert McNab and Doowan Lee. The 
intellect they provided was sometimes frustrating because problems I spent days 
wrestling with, they provided solutions for in literally seconds. They are truly two of the 
most intellectual individuals I have met and I hope to one day influence young minds the 
way they have. Thank you. 
xvi 
 





Since 2002, coalitions of the willing have appropriated $39 billion to Afghanistan 
and $46.7 billion to Iraq for reconstruction spending.1 The dollar amounts suggest that 
reconstruction is important in post-conflict environments, but how important is it really? 
Reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq commenced in some fashion soon after 
United States’ boots touched the ground. The manner in which funds have been spent, 
and the controversy surrounding corruption scandals, have recently brought much 
attention to the subject. Those tasked with reconstruction oversight have been asked to 
ensure funds are spent in the most efficient manner possible. Some military commanders 
who oversee various types of reconstruction funding have interestingly noticed a 
relationship between the insurgency and reconstruction spending—most notably through 
the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). In post-conflict environments, 
CERP reconstruction efforts can be applied in such a manner that they contribute to the 
diffusion of the incubation and growth of insurgencies. 
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was developed in fiscal year 
2003 to give commanders the ability to quickly respond to emergency humanitarian and 
reconstruction needs in their area of operations, and is currently available to commanders 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.2 The program began following the discovery of 
millions of dollars of stockpiled Ba’athist cash by U.S. forces in Iraq. As of July 2009, 
Congress had appropriated a total of $5.25 billion to CERP, with $3.63 billion3 and $1.62 
billion4 to Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. CERP is funded through the military’s 
                                                 
1 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan and Iraq Reconstruction, “April 30, 2009 Quarterly Report 
to Congress,” http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct09/pdf/SIGAROct2009Web.pdf, 5, and 
http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Apr09/pdf/Section2_-_April_2009.pdf, 26 (accessed May 22, 
2009). 
2 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Management of the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006,” http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-006.pdf 
(accessed March 19, 2009). 
3 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Tables: Iraq Reconstruction Funding Sources and 
Uses,” http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/tables.aspx#Section2 (accessed October 28, 
2009). 
4 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “July 30, 2009 Quarterly Report to 
Congress,” http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/pdf/Report_-_July_2009.pdf, 34. 
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Operations and Maintenance (OMA) account, rather than as a part of a reconstruction aid 
package.5 The original intent of CERP was to enable commanders to “respond to urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, 
by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people…”6 However, 
some have noticed strong ancillary benefits. The title of the CERP Standard Operating 
Procedure book is “Money as a Weapon System,” which alludes to the ability of CERP to 
influence hearts and minds. 
In an attempt to determine what was contributing to the fertility of insurgent 
recruiting in 2004 Baghdad, then Major General Peter Chiarelli determined that he could 
deny insurgent influence by creating visible progress through the application of essential 
services construction, increased employment and perceived government 
progress/involvement.7 Similarly, Helmus et al. (2007) argue that U.S. forces can use 
Civil Military Operations (CMO) and CERP funds to encourage civilian behavior.8 They 
state that projects may be allocated or strategically withheld based on adherence to U.S. 
operational norms.  
Others such as Biddle (2006) and Pernie and O’Connell (2008) argue that there is 
no direct correlation between the provision or essential services and the propensity of a 
population to support an insurgency.9 Biddle argued that reconstruction efforts will never 
be more than marginal benefits that never really get to the heart of the problem.10 Is 
$46.7 billion appropriated for all major Iraq reconstruction an appropriate amount to 
                                                 
5 Christopher Griffin, “A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t the Only Strategy for Afghanistan,” Armed Forces 
Journal April, 2007 http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2587549/ (accessed October 31, 2009). 
6 Mark Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 37 
(2005): 47. 
7 Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum 
Operations,” Military Review, Jul-Aug (2005): 10. 
8 Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul and Russell Glenn, “Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing 
Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 
139. 
9 Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003-2006” (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2008), 86. 
10 Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 2. 
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spend on marginal support? Is the support even marginal? This research directly 
addresses these questions. 
The somewhat sporadic application of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, along with the lack of a noticeable relationship between reconstruction and 
insurgent activity has led to belief that reconstruction efforts are marginal at best. Much 
of the value of reconstruction is in the prioritization of projects. Numerous methods of 
prioritization have been used; however such methods have generally focused narrowly on 
the needs of provincial sized communities. Additionally, there are many other factors at 
play—such as personalities of power brokers, bribery/corruption, and interagency 
conundrums. The state of the theories supports this notion—prioritization has not been 
conducted in such a way to maximize ancillary benefits; which can actually be more 
important than the intended physical result. Thus, it is difficult to determine the true 
intricacies of the relationship between reconstruction and violence.  
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
It is clear that several dynamic factors influence the nature of conflict. Popular 
support in any type of conflict is always something national and international forces will 
have to grapple with. In a type of conflict where the enemy is vying for the exact same 
support base, the environment becomes significantly more complex. The ability to 
capture and kill threats to national and international norms is an important component for 
the provision of security, but this component alone rarely if ever prevents further violence 
—especially when considering a budding insurgency. Security and reconstruction are not 
independent, rather they are interdependent. This has become a resounding reality in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The extent to which reconstruction can be used to influence the security 
situation is extremely valuable to the optimization of the security environment and money 
spent on reconstruction. This thesis is an effort to understand how and to what extent 
reconstruction can influence the security environment. In a fight against insurgents, 
counterinsurgents have become painfully aware that non-lethal methods are potentially 
more important than lethal methods. In post-conflict environments, CERP reconstruction 
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efforts can be applied in such a manner that they contribute to the diffusion of the 
incubation and growth of insurgencies. 
There are two primary purposes of this research. First, to determine if CERP has 
historically influenced the security environment in any measureable way and second, to 
develop a model comprised of those components that could plausibly be argued to have 
an effect on violence according to Social Movement Theory and determine which 
components most significantly influence insurgency.  
As stated previously the model was developed in congruence with Social 
Movement Theory, encompassing those components that would most significantly 
contribute to the diffusion of contentious collective action. It is comprised of three 
primary components: needs, deserve and message resonance. The needs are determined 
based on the assessed status of popular needs and a population’s perception of the value 
they place on various needs based on Maslow’s hierarchy. The deserve component is 
determined based on a combination of a village/neighborhood’s actions and attitudes. The 
combination of these two factors uses behavioral indicators to determine the level of the 
population’s support toward the counterinsurgency. Finally, the messages accompanying 
a project determine the extent to which the results of the project resonate. The following 
section provides further understanding of the components of this thesis. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Dependent Variable 
In order to determine the contribution of the independent variables toward 
successful CERP implementation at the village level, a dependent variable (DV) figure 
for comparison was established to depict the relative success of CERP implementation in 





DV1 represents the simple ratio between money spent and violence at the village 
level. DV2 represents the same ratio with locally normalized violence. DV3 represents 
the ration between CERP money spent and violence at the village level and is locally 
normalized by violence and population size. A higher output represents a more successful 
CERP to violence ratio. In other words, $10 spent per 10 violent acts is worse than $10 
spent per 5 violent acts. This ratio represent the success of CERP implementation.  
2. Independent Variables 
a. IV1: Project Characteristics 
Project characteristics consist of the needs of the population and indicators 
of how much the population deserves to have their needs fulfilled. Thus, the two primary 
components are Needs and Deserve.  
The needs of one village or neighborhood are obviously almost always 
different than another village or neighborhood. Additionally, the residents of those 
locations could perceive the value of their needs at different levels. In low-intensity and 
post-conflict societies, Maslow’s Physiological and Safety needs are typically unfulfilled. 
Analysis of an indigenous society’s perception and prioritization of physiological/safety 
needs is paramount in determining how to weight the incentive of reconstruction. 
Knowing how an indigenous society values their needs is critical; 
however, it is only part of the solution. A ground truth assessment is also needed for each 
village to determine the actual status of basic needs. Village assessments are used for this 
research and embody data on the status of 30 different essential service related entities.  
Analysis of deserve indicators reveals that passive supporters of an 
insurgency constitute the portion of the population that CERP can most beneficially 
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affect. Therefore, the measures for optimization should be weighted based on the 
probability that a particular project will gain support from this part of the population. 
Indicators of a population’s behavior can be thought of as actions and attitudes. Based on 
the availability of data this research uses seven indicators for actions and attitudes. 
Actions are comprised of: the level penetration of “Bad guys” into a 
village/neighborhood (BAC), the amount of tips that a village/neighborhood provides to 
governmental or security forces (TAC) and the SIGACTs in a village/neighborhood (SAC). 
Attitudes are comprised of: surveyed confidence in the Criminal justice system (CAT), the 
abilities of the Government (GAT), the ability of the local Army (AAT), and the ability of 
the local police forces (PAT). The proper consideration of all seven components, and the 
appropriate weighting of the components, is fundamental to the maximization of the 
incentive nature of CERP projects through the provision to that part of the population 
most deserving. 
The needs and deserve components are useful in the determination of how 
support can be leveraged based on which behavioral indicators. However, these 
components alone do not fully consider all factors that can influence the ancillary effects 
of reconstruction projects. The degree to which the story accompanying message 
resonance spreads will determine how the greater area will be influenced by project 
completion.  
b. IV2: Message Resonance 
Determination of the extent to which the message accompanying a CERP 
reconstruction project will resonate is clearly context dependent. For this research, I 
analyzed the phenomenon from the micro, meso, and macro levels. These three levels, 
with regard to CERP reconstruction, can best be thought of according to the following 
classification: 
Micro—Will they see it? 
Meso—Will they talk about it? Maybe they don’t see it but their neighbors do. 
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Macro—Will they hear about it, read about it, or watch it? 
To determine the extent to which the people of a village will see a project, 
I used the population densities of each village. Much like with the spread of infectious 
disease, the denser a population, the more likely a message is to spread. For the meso 
level analysis, I examine the proximity of each village to every other village to determine 
the likelihood that residents of one village would talk about CERP reconstruction projects 
in another village. It is more likely that tightly clustered villages will have a higher 
exposure to the goings on of a nearby village or adjoining neighborhood than of a distant 
village. The macro level is slightly more complicated. Data on the availability of media 
throughout an area of operations is needed to determine where and how far the various 
media outlets will carry the story. This research uses buffers to determine which areas are 
privy to which media outlets. A sum score of the media outlets available to each area 
depicts the degree to which the media can be used to spread a story. Villages with a 
higher score have greater access to media. The combination of all message resonance 
levels determines the degree to which the construction of a project in one village or 
neighborhood will provide ancillary effects in gaining popular support in surrounding 
areas.  
3. Analysis and Testing 
Upon establishment of the model, the interplay of the independent variable 
components are analyzed in relation to the dependent variable. Multivariate regressions at 
the village level are used to determine the extent to which each component contributes to 
the dependent variable. The independent variables are then manipulated mathematically 
to provide a prioritization output for further analysis. 
The model is tested using village level data from the At Tameem (Kirkuk) 
province of Iraq. Village assessments, violence data, reconstruction data and surveyed 
popular beliefs were collected through the Iraqi Army and U.S. forces currently stationed 
in the province. The data are formatted according to a sample of 168 villages distributed 
throughout the province. A summary of the findings is presented below. 
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C. SUMMARIZED FINDINGS 
The results derived through this model generate a number of testable implications 
on the relationship between CERP reconstruction and violence. First, there has 
historically been a weak positive relationship between CERP reconstruction and violence. 
This is true for both the sample set and the total 695 villages that exist in the province. 
For the sample set, for every $40,000 spent on CERP there is one violent act.  
Second, analysis of spatio-temporal data reveals that in the At Tameem province 
U.S. forces have not intended to utilize CERP as a tool against insurgency. In other 
words, CERP has not been used as a “weapon system” as the Standard Operating 
Procedure handbook alludes to. Violence was not negatively affected as a result of CERP 
project completion and CERP projects were not planned for areas where popular support 
was ripe for influence.  
Third, in the analysis of those areas where CERP was most successful (i.e., it 
most significantly negatively influenced violence), it was revealed that the deserve and 
message resonance components carry much more weight than the needs component. In 
other words, if the purpose of CERP is to influence popular support, then the actual needs 
of the people are of least importance. It should be noted that this finding is based around 
the fact that there are numerous other reconstruction funds that can and should be 
allocated to provide for the basic needs of that part of the population from which support 
already exists. Thus, in an attempt to win popular support, prioritization of CERP 
expenditures should consider that the needs of the people are notably less important than 
their behavior and the degree to which the “story” about the resulting project will 
resonate.  
D. STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter II provides a 
theoretical framework that explains the theory, current state of the literature, the variables 
and respective components. Chapter III expounds upon IV1, providing the components 
9 
 
and math behind incorporation into the model. Chapter IV addresses the role of the 
message that accompanies reconstruction projects. This chapter uses a spatial perspective 
to determine how themes and messages can have a compounding effect on project 
completion. Chapter V is a case study of At Tameem Province of Iraq. This chapter uses 
real-world data from 695 villages and 168 village assessments to determine the 
relationship of CERP reconstruction and violence and to test the model in a real world 
scenario. The intent of this chapter is to determine if CERP has influenced localized 
violence and to examine which components of the model most influence violence. 
Chapter VI draws on the At Tameem case study to demonstrate the implications of the 
model and on the broader post-conflict security environment. It provides a summary of 
key findings, implications and recommendations. Finally, the appendices provide 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The nature of contentious collective action in low-intensity or post-conflict 
environments is incredibly complex. Social movements are “collective challenges, based 
on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities.”11 These types of collective action generate strength because 
they challenge power holders, produce cohesion and have meaning within particular 
population groups and cultures.12 When these types of movements become violent, as 
they often do in limited or low-intensity conflicts, the value of non-lethal approaches may 
actually be more important than that of lethal approaches, and both approaches are 
fundamentally interrelated. In low-intensity or post-conflict environments, successful 
reconstruction efforts are those that are applied in such a manner that they contribute to 
the diffusion of the incubation and growth of social movements. My first independent 
variable, characteristics of reconstruction projects, consists of prioritization based on how 
much a particular village or neighborhood needs a project and how much the village or 
neighborhood deserves the project. My second independent variable, accompanying 
message resonance, consists of those efforts designed to counter opposing strategic 
frames. The probability that reconstruction efforts will be successful is dependent on the 
characteristics of reconstruction projects compounded by the accompanying message 
resonance. 
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. Section A will elaborate on 
the relationship between reconstruction and state legitimacy. Section B follows with a 
detailed description of reconstruction efforts in those low-intensity and post-conflict 
environments with a current U.S. presence. Section C reviews existing literature on 
reconstruction, insurgency and arguments of any links therein. In Section D Social 
Movement Theory is introduced as a theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
influence of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) reconstruction on 
                                                 




insurgency. Section E presents the components of my argument and Section F concludes 
with the methodology for the remainder of this research.  
A. RECONSTRUCTION AND STATE LEGITIMACY 
Reconstruction exists as a tool for the de-escalation of violent or potentially 
violent social movements. The World Bank defines reconstruction as “the rebuilding of 
the socioeconomic framework of society” and the rebuilding of enabling conditions for a 
functioning peacetime society—to include the economy, governance and the rule of 
law.13 Orr classifies post-conflict reconstruction more broadly as those efforts designed 
to help an indigenous government build a minimally capable state in four specific areas: 
security, governance and participation, social and economic well being, and justice and 
reconciliation.14 All four of these pillars of reconstruction are long-term capacity goals 
that are vital to a state achieving a level of legitimacy that is deemed acceptable by its 
constituents. A discussion of the relationship between reconstruction and state legitimacy 
is necessary for an understanding of the long-term implications involved in undertaking 
the task of reconstruction.  
The difficulty in justifying the expenditure of large amounts of money in post-
conflict reconstruction is in the inability to effectively measure the effects of 
reconstruction on the environment. Campaign plans for Iraq and Afghanistan for at least 
the past five years have included overarching goals for the improvement of five major 
categories: security, governance, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and 
infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.15 Measurements that do exist to identify the 
contribution of reconstruction toward these major goals demonstrate that reconstruction is 
really nothing more than a fringe contributor to any category. Biddle (2006) contends that 
                                                 
13 World Bank, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank” (Washington D.C.: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998), 14. 
14 Robert Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
(Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 11. 
15 U.S. Department of State, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf (accessed 16 November, 2008). 
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reconstruction and economic aid provide only marginal benefits that will never really get 
to the core of the problem in Iraq.16 The data that exists support this argument and the 
attitude of those indirectly involved with reconstruction generally supports this argument 
as well. Thus, the purpose of this study is to evaluate whether reconstruction really is just 
a marginal contribution to post-conflict stability, or if the current data only support this 
argument because of the haphazard and unsynchronized application of reconstruction 
projects.  
As nations attempt to regain their footing following major conflict, the struggle 
for legitimacy is influenced by several factors and, with the presence of an international 
actor(s), the factors influencing legitimacy become significantly more complex. As 
conflict transforms from high-intensity to low-intensity, expectations invariably mount 
among the population for a more promising future. As transition unfolds, key power 
brokers emerge and often promise a return to a normalized status as a tradeoff for short-
term stability, to meet the expectations of constituents. Quite often, the more the power 
brokers follow through with their promises, the more expectations are met, and the more 
their legitimacy grows. Gilley (2009) says legitimacy is a particular type of political 
support that is grounded in common good or shared moral evaluations.17 In other words, 
legitimacy is rooted in shared norms and values. However, the widespread presence of 
shared norms and values in post-conflict societies is not a common characteristic—
especially in those societies that have just emerged from civil war or conflicts of long 
duration. So what are the pre-existing conditions in terms of how a post-conflict society 
develops shared norms and values, and how does the satisfaction of these conditions (or 
lack thereof) contribute to the strength of legitimacy? 
After studying the counterinsurgency in Iraq from 2003–2006, RAND authors 
Pirnie and O’Connell (2008) concluded that there was no direct correlation between the 
provision of essential services and the propensity of a population to support an 
                                                 
16 Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 2. 
17 Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule (New York: Colombia University Press, 2009), 5. 
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insurgency.18 However, the authors go on to say that reconstruction is important in 
counterinsurgency because people associate it with a legitimate government. While Pirnie 
and O’Connell argue there is no direct relationship between reconstruction and popular 
support for an insurgency, they do seem to suggest that there is a direct relationship 
between reconstruction and legitimacy of the government.  
Since the popular support for a state over that for an insurgency is strongly linked 
to the strength of state legitimacy, reconstruction proves a valuable tool in the 
development of legitimacy. And, with the role of international actors in the post-conflict 
affairs of a minimally capable state, reconstruction becomes extremely valuable in the 
legitimacy of the international actor and the new government that the international actor 
is trying to legitimize. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a useful tool for the analysis of this 
relationship (Figure 2.1).19 The concept holds that those most basic needs, at the bottom 
of the pyramid, must be satisfied first to allow growth and upward movement. The higher 
needs will not become clear until basic needs are realized. When a new government takes 
power, or an international actor assumes governmental control, an expectation is 
established for the provision of basic governmental services; which entails meeting the 
shared moral standards of a political community that Gilley discusses with regard to 
legitimacy.20 With the chaos inherent in a post-conflict society, the difficulty in providing 
for the needs of a country is immense. Depending on the nature of the conflict, needs may 
range from those most basic in severely damaged areas to non-existent in areas less 
burdened by the destruction of war.  
                                                 
18 Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003-2006” (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2008), 86. 
19 A.H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review, 50 (1943): 370–396. 




Figure 2.1. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
When considering Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in post-conflict environments, it 
is important to note that if the government isn’t providing the most basic needs, people 
will find a way to satisfy their needs as a matter of survival. The satisfaction of 
physiological and safety needs by a government is required in the quest for legitimacy. 
The roots of legitimacy are in shared norms and values, which comprise the upper half of 
Maslow’s hierarchy. Without the fulfillment of basic physiological and safety needs, the 
people of a post-conflict society may find it difficult to put stock into shared norms and 
values. As lower-level basic needs are provided, a population will begin to aspire to 
higher-level needs. With upward movement toward the belonging and esteem needs, a 
population will become more inclined to organize and build or reform institutions. With 
institutional formation comes shared understandings and expectations. Interestingly, it is 
often the upper half of Maslow’s hierarchy that insurgents tend to target with tools such 
as propaganda. This likely has something to do with their desire to generate a common 
understanding and develop a mechanism for movement toward contentious collective 
action. The ability of a state or international actor to manage shared understandings and 
fulfill expectations will ultimately steer the course of governmental legitimacy.  
This discussion of the relationship between reconstruction and state legitimacy is 
important for the understanding of long-term governmental capacity goals, but it also 
demonstrates the potential for reconstruction to influence insurgency—whether directly 
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or indirectly. The purpose of this research is to determine if reconstruction can be used in 
the short-term to influence conflict. The following section will elaborate on the specifics 
of reconstruction efforts in those areas with current U.S. presence. 
B. BACKGROUND ON CURRENT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS 
The numerous types of reconstruction spending make it difficult to analyze their 
influence on the security environment unless they are unpacked. A description of the 
different types of reconstruction available, taken with consideration of those actors most 
able to influence the security environment, will lead to a discussion on the importance of 
CERP. Finally, elaboration on the CERP will highlight the program’s potential to 
influence the security environment—both positively and negatively. 
In Afghanistan and Iraq, there are several types of reconstruction funding, macro 
to micro in scale. Critical infrastructure reconstruction, utilizing appropriated funds such 
as Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) and the Economic Support and 
Development Assistance Funds in Afghanistan, provide macro level examples that would 
typically be controlled by the U.S. State Department,21 the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As of 
October 2008, 97% of the congressionally appropriated $20.9 billion IRRF funds were 
obligated for various macro level projects.22 Such projects primarily include 
infrastructural necessities such as water, electricity and sewer systems for one or more 
provinces. At the micro level, as of July 2009 Congress has appropriated a total of $5.25 
billion to the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). The appropriations  
 
                                                 
21 Apportioned funds such as the IRRF, ISFF, ESF and CERP are restricted to six departments or 
agencies: DoD, DoS, USAID, Treasury, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Department of Health 
and Human Services, http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/jan09/pdf/app_e_-_january_2009.pdf 
(accessed March 19, 2009).    
22 U.S. Department of State, “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, October 2008,” 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/115549.htm (accessed March 18, 2009). 
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amount to $3.63 billion23 and $1.62 billion24 in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. This 
research will focus on the micro level—specifically on CERP because it resides in the 
hands of combatant commanders who most directly address local conditions, especially 
security conditions.  
The CERP program was developed in fiscal year 2003 to give commanders the 
ability to respond to emergency humanitarian and reconstruction needs in their area of 
operations, and is currently available to commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan and the 
Philippines.25 The program began in 2003, following the discovery of millions of dollars 
of stockpiled Ba’athist cash by U.S. forces in Iraq. With the collapse of the Iraqi 
government and the discovery of dilapidated state of Iraqi public services, commanders 
found themselves straddling the tasks of actively engaging the enemy and providing 
public services. Following approval of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
FRAGO 89 was published on June 19, enabling commanders to “respond to urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, 
by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people”26 Although CERP 
funds were initially intended for more humanitarian assistance and relief purposes of 
immediate impact, a much larger value was quickly realized. General Peter Chiarelli, for 
example, effectively demonstrated in 2005 how the provision of basic essential services 
in Sadr City had a direct correlation with insurgent activity.27 The financial muscle 
possessed by commanders at the company level and up has proven paramount in the 
improvement of basic governmental functions and economic conditions, connecting with 
                                                 
23 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Tables: Iraq Reconstruction Funding Sources 
and Uses,” http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/tables.aspx#Section2 (accessed October 28, 
2009). 
24 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “July 30, 2009 Quarterly Report to 
Congress,” http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jul09/pdf/Report_-_July_2009.pdf, 34. 
25 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Management of the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006,” http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-006.pdf 
(accessed March 19, 2009). 
26 Mark Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 37 
(2005): 47. 
27 Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum 
Operations,” Military Review, Jul-Aug (2005): 9. 
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the local populace and ultimately defeating the insurgency. When used optimally by 
commanders, CERP has positively impacted the lines of operation [security, governance, 
humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and 
reconstruction].28 CERP funds provide an adequate source of interim relief and can 
provide permanent solutions if appropriately tied to long-term objectives. A potential 
criticism of CERP, however, is the lack of coordinated effects across areas of 
responsibility. 
A large benefit of CERP is in its ability to effectively streamline early 
reconstruction efforts—capable of quickly producing visible results. However, the most 
common complaint by Iraqis in 2007 was the lack of visible results after four years of 
U.S. occupation.29 This contradiction may be due to the extreme discretion given to 
commanders with, in some cases, a lack of a synchronizing mechanism to measure 
combined effects. While visible results are important, the secondary and tertiary effects 
may actually be more important. If employed properly, CERP contributions to basic 
services and other governmental functions create a perception among the populace that 
aids significantly in legitimizing the developing local and central governments. Such 
ancillary benefits are an example of what makes reconstruction so important to 
counterinsurgents. One way CERP manifests itself in a counterinsurgent capacity is 
through connecting commanders with the population, resulting in an increase in 
information flow. As the population becomes comfortable with the activity and presence 
of Soldiers conducting CERP activities, a cycle of trust is built. Soldiers become more 
understanding of the culture and society within which they are conducting operations. 
Subsequently, they are able to more appropriately and effectively provide for popular 
needs via the CERP. Intelligence in counterinsurgency is about people and what makes it  
 
 
                                                 
28 U.S. Department of State, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf (accessed 16 November, 2008). 
29 Zeyad Junade Omar, Major, Iraqi Army, personal interview, Kirkuk, Iraq, May 16, 2007. 
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so challenging is the amount of socio-cultural information that must be gathered and 
understood.30 The proper use of CERP contributes immensely to this demand; however, 
the improper use can certainly hinder efforts. 
While the importance of reconstruction in affecting social movements has proved 
successful in a few cases like General Chiarelli’s, numerous challenges are presented to 
preclude optimization. Failure to recognize the potential strength of reconstruction has 
led to poor or ineffective use—especially at the CERP level. Some commanders tend to 
compete with peer commanders for headline-grabbing victories.31 Such was the case in 
Kirkuk, Iraq in 2007. A Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) commander, who did not own 
any battle space, was eager to spend CERP funds for the construction of a playground in 
a Kirkuk neighborhood. The commander spent $74,000 on a playground in a 
neighborhood that had no electricity or running water. He was subsequently featured in 
numerous local and international newspapers.32 Despite the earlier recommendations of 
an Iraqi civil affairs officer to address the needs of the local people, he bullishly 
mandated that a playground be built. The result was a showcasing of the most money 
spent rather than of the most positive effects achieved, and in this case poor use created 
negative effects. Today the playground is surrounded by a six-foot fence topped with 
barbed wire and access is only granted with the presence of a security guard. Sewage 
continues to flow down the side streets and electrical wires hang above the playground, 
linking neighbors to personal generators. Occasionally there are kids in the playground. 
The neighborhood where the playground was built continues to be one of Kirkuk’s most 
violent. 
On July 15, 2009, Representative John Murtha, Chairman of the House 
Appropriations defense sub-committee, wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates stating that “A fundamental review of CERP, its purposes, use and scope, is long 
                                                 
30 United States Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 135. 
31 Martins, 51. 
32 This article ran in numerous local and U.S. newspapers. One example of the article can be found 
here: http://www.25idl.army.mil/HAW/Oct2007/Haw%2005Oct07.pdf.  
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overdue.”33 This letter came after the newly opened Caravan Hotel in Baghdad was 
looted as coalition forces turned the completed CERP project over to Iraqi officials. The 
targets of the looting were flat screen televisions, computers and high class furniture—all 
bought with CERP funds. As some officials feared, the availability of the funds to 
commanders may actually be too wide. Additionally, the discontinuity created by 
continual personnel rotations negates any potential credibility and positive processes 
from trending upward. Instead reconstruction efforts tend to ebb and flow with the 
rotation cycles. Finally, most commanders apply reconstruction based simply on the 
anticipated physical results the projects. They fail to consider the power of incentive 
behind such projects. In other words, they spend money on a playground because they 
think it will make children happy, but don’t consider the impact that fixing the existing 
underground sewers could have on personal grievances within a neighborhood. 
C. STATE OF THE LITERATURE 
The nature of low-intensity and post-conflict environments has required those 
involved to become grudgingly aware of the role of “hearts and minds.” The preceding 
phrase, which potentially flirts with an issue of overuse, serves as a constant reminder of 
the importance of a population in insurgent environments. Fundamentally, 
counterinsurgents compete with insurgents for the support of the population. Ultimately, 
a state must gain legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents to maintain stability. According 
to past and current counterinsurgency practitioners alike, successful counterinsurgency 
practices focus on the population, their needs, and security.34  This section will review 
key arguments on the role of popular support in counterinsurgency. Next, a review of the 
literature on reconstruction and arguments over the prioritization of reconstruction will 
highlight the progression of reconstruction thought. Finally, arguments on the potential 
links between insurgency and reconstruction will be reviewed. 
                                                 
33 Ernesto Londono, “U.S. ‘Money Weapon’ Yields Mixed Results,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/26/AR2009072602833.html.  
34 Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-Jun (2005): 10. 
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1. Counterinsurgency Literature 
Over the past six years, research on insurgency has been vigorously raked over 
and expounded upon. The synergy of scholarship and continual experience has elevated 
understanding of insurgency to a new level. As stated previously, a fundamental principle 
of the counterinsurgency literature is the role of the population. In 1937, Mao stated 
“Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it 
can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and 
cooperation.”35 In 1966, Galula stated the support of the population is as important for 
insurgents as it is for counterinsurgents.36 Literature published since the beginning of 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq carries the same theme. Sepp (2005)37 and Nagl 
(2005)38 both discuss the importance of the population and the fulfillment of their needs 
to ensure their satisfaction. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, states that “Irregular warfare depends not just on our military prowess, but also 
on our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious 
influences, and cultural mores.”39 The concept of focusing on the population as the center 
of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is now widely accepted across the battlefield. 
But the degree to which it is understood and practiced with regard to reconstruction 
varies considerably.  
2. Reconstruction Literature 
Much the same as research on counterinsurgency has developed recently, so too 
has research on low-intensity and post-conflict reconstruction. As significant U.S. 
                                                 
35 Samuel Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation 
Publishing Company of America, 1992), 71. 
36 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 74. 
37 Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” 10. 
38 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 22. 
39 John Nagl, David Patreaus, James Amos, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 1. 
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counterinsurgency efforts in two countries persist and checks continue to be written, 
significant concern over the effectiveness of reconstruction spending has surfaced.40 The 
literature on reconstruction is focused according to three major themes: the purpose of 
reconstruction, the prioritization of reconstruction, and the relationship between 
reconstruction and security. There is a substantial amount of literature that supports the 
argument that reconstruction is important in low-intensity or post-conflict environments, 
but a comparatively small amount of literature argues whether reconstruction contributes 
to social movements, to what extent, and by what means. 
a. The Purpose of Post-conflict Reconstruction 
Orr (2004) argues that the areas of security, governance and participation, 
social and economic well being, and justice and reconciliation are all vital for a state to 
achieve legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents.41 He goes on to argue that post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts should be designed to assist in the development of a minimally 
capable state through one or more of these areas. The Guidebook for Economic 
Development in Stability Operations states the primary goal of stability operations is to 
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment.42 It goes on to insinuate that 
economic well being influences a population’s interest in establishing and maintaining 
security. The Guidebook then states the secondary goal of reconstruction is to enhance 
the reputation of the national government in the eyes of its constituents.43  
The recurring theme throughout this section of the literature suggests that 
reconstruction is critical to the maturation of a state’s legitimacy as perceived by the 
state’s constituents. This literature is a valuable contribution to this research because of 
                                                 
40 See “U.S. ‘Money Weapon’ Yields Mixed Results,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/26/AR2009072602833.html.  
41 Orr, Winning the Peace, American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 11. 
42 Keith Crane, et. al, “Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations,” 




the nexus between governmental legitimacy, insurgency, and reconstruction. Thus, 
reconstruction has the ability to impact insurgency, whether directly or indirectly. 
b. The Prioritization of Reconstruction Efforts 
There is wide agreement in the literature acknowledging the importance of 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs in the prioritization of reconstruction efforts. The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers has used this methodology doctrinally for quite some time.44 
The SWEAT/IR Book demonstrates the importance of prioritizing the needs of the people 
based on SWEAT/IR (Sewer, Water, Electric, Academics, Trash/Infrastructure 
Reconnaissance) assessments.  
Timilsina (2007) developed a reconstruction prioritization framework 
based on case studies from Cambodia, Mozambique and Haiti and interviews with 
reconstruction practitioners.45 She argues that reconstruction efforts should focus on 
security and relief assistance first, and then on governance and economic stabilization. 
She develops a hierarchy of priorities by sector that serve as an appropriate set of 
guidelines for initial reconstruction planning.46 Additionally, her case studies and 
interviews provide valuable lessons learned for consideration in prioritization. 
Lindberg (2008) conducted a study establishing a methodology for the 
prioritization of reconstruction efforts based on the perceived feedback on military Lines 
of Effort (LOE’s).47 Lindberg develops a model called Critical Infrastructure Portfolio 
Selection in which he weighs project costs and construction risks. However, Lindberg’s 
assumptions are made in a vacuum—he fails to account for the dynamics of the insurgent 
                                                 
44 United States Army Engineer School, “The SWEAT/IR Book: Infrastructure Reconnaissance,” 
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environment. Lindberg’s model is not flexible enough to account for changes in the 
insurgent environment or quickly adjust to counterinsurgent demands. In congruence 
with most writers on the topic, Lindberg does not acknowledge the community aspect at 
all and focuses his efforts simply on the amount of people the projects will affect—
essentially half the picture.  
c. The Relationship between Security and Reconstruction 
As the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have progressed and measures of 
effectiveness have matured, there has been an increase in the amount of literature that 
analyzes the link between reconstruction and insurgency. Initially, research on 
reconstruction was focused on the fundamental purposes, and then on how best to 
prioritize projects to maximize the number of people served. Slowly, thinking has 
evolved to consider the impacts of reconstruction projects on the security environment. In 
an attempt to determine what was contributing to the fertility of insurgent recruiting in 
2004 Baghdad, then Major General Peter Chiarelli determined that he could deny 
insurgent influence by creating visible progress through the application of essential 
services construction, increased employment and perceived government 
progress/involvement.48 General Chiarelli was among the first to document the potential 
for reconstruction to influence the security environment, and certainly the first in the Iraq 
conflict to employ such measures. 
Helmus et al. (2007) argue that U.S. forces can use Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) and CERP funds to encourage civilian behavior.49 They state that 
projects may be allocated or strategically withheld based on adherence to U.S. 
operational norms…but expectations must be clearly identified and set forth for the 
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population.50 The authors encourage the use of CMO rewards to highlight the benefits of 
popular compliance. Focus by the authors on the incentive nature of such projects is 
critical and they go on to warn of the potential danger if insurgent groups become 
familiar with the process and deliberately take action to deny aid. 
Finally, only one source acknowledges the importance of prioritizing the 
location of reconstruction projects. Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2008), conclude that 
greater service provision generally leads to less violence when applied according to 
“community characteristics.”51 By community characteristics the authors are referring 
specifically to levels of social cohesion, sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and 
natural resource endowments. They predicated their research on the development of a 
counterinsurgency model showcasing a three party struggle over information between the 
government, rebels and the population. Berman et al argue that the population will only 
share information if the benefits outweigh the costs. At first glance, the authors found that 
there is a positive relationship between the provision of public goods and violence. 
However, upon analysis of the provision of public goods according to community 
characteristics, the authors find a negative relationship between public good provision 
and violence, as predicted. Berman et al correctly conclude that in addition to their 
research, governments and aid agencies require better guidance on where investments 
will yield the highest returns in terms of social order and reduced violence. Their 
conclusions are broad in that the provision of public goods reduces levels of violence. 
The authors discuss the incentive nature of public good provision, but stop short of 
assessing how the incentive value can be used by counterinsurgents at the lowest level to 
gain popular support. Additionally, the authors’ use of the district level of analysis in Iraq  
 
 
                                                 
50 Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul and Russell Glenn, “Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing 
Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 
139. 
51 Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics 
of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 35. http://econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/ham.pdf, December 2008. 
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is too broad as the decentralization of spending within districts is abundant. Analysis at 
the district level cannot effectively capture the motivation of a village to lend their 
support for one side or the other. 
There are also those authors who argue there is no connection between 
reconstruction and insurgency. As stated previously, Pirnie and O’Connell (2008) argue 
that there is no direct correlation between the provision or essential services and the 
propensity of a population to support an insurgency.52 They do argue, however, that 
reconstruction is important in counterinsurgency because it adds to the legitimacy of the 
indigenous government. An increase in governmental legitimacy would likely lead to an 
increase in popular support—for the counterinsurgents.  
Biddle (2006) argues that reconstruction and economic aid will not fix the 
problem in Iraq.53 Biddle argues that reconstruction efforts are essentially fringe or 
marginal benefits that will never really get to the heart of the problem. The author states 
that the war in Iraq should be fought as a communal civil war and the methods proposed 
by the Bush administration will not work in defeating the Iraqi insurgency. Biddle fails to 
acknowledge the presence and importance of those results of reconstruction efforts that 
are other than simply visible. The ancillary benefits of reconstruction, such as improved 
relationships, networking, employment, perception of improvement, perception of 
government legitimacy, etc., may actually be contributing significantly to the defeat of 
the insurgency in Iraq. Helmus et al. make the argument that these types of projects can 
in fact provide ancillary benefits. But perhaps the visible results are actually more 
important. 
The literature addressing counterinsurgency and reconstruction is 
abundant, but a relatively small amount analyzes whether reconstruction directly 
contributes to counterinsurgency and to what extent. Further, there is no research on the 
development of a model to show where the greatest effects can be achieved if 
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reconstruction does influence insurgency. A more robust analysis is vital to the 
realization of the true importance of reconstruction in post-conflict environments. 
D. THEORY 
Social Movement Theory (SMT) provides a useful lens for the analysis of 
counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict due to the group level dynamics involved 
(Figure 2.2). This section will refine the definition of social movements, discuss the 
major components and progression of social movements and outline why SMT is useful 
for the analysis of the influence of reconstruction on insurgency. I then present a 
systematic look at SMT and discuss how the systemized perspective assists in the 
understanding of reconstruction’s impact on insurgency. 
As stated previously, social movements are “collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, 
and authorities.”54 These types of collective action generate strength because they 
challenge power holders, produce cohesion and have meaning within particular 
population groups and cultures.55 Tarrow (1998) states that social movements ultimately 
seek to develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents 
based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames.56 Social 
movement theorists57 typically explain the theory according to three important, strongly 
interlinked components that contribute to the power of collective action: political 
opportunity, mobilizing structures and strategic framing processes. Social movement 
theory is valuable to this research because the types of conflicts where CERP funds are 
currently available (Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines) are ridden with movements 
that pose a threat to the security and stability of the state. 
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Figure 2.2. A Systematic Look at SMT 
Although the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines have not been 
exclusively grievance driven, with examples such as the ethnic/sectarian violence in 
2006–2007 Iraq, grievances against the state are prevalent in low-intensity and post-
conflict societies when a government is struggling to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its 
constituents. Even in situations where ethnic or sectarian difficulties arise, there is 
regularly the presence of grievance toward the state in terms of bias. Insurgencies 
typically occur under the presence of grievance. Social movement theory helps explain 
why. 
In most cases, individuals in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines are not violent 
from the onset; rather they are transformed through a vehicle of contentious collective 
action to use violence as a tool. This research will view the theory from a systematic 
perspective; in that there are inputs (exogenous factors), there are internal transforming 
factors (endogenous factors) and then there is the output of movement violence. Critical 
to the understanding of social movements is that both exogenous and endogenous 
variables are at work. CERP reconstruction projects appear valuable when understood 
through this model as they can intervene with both the exogenous and endogenous 
variables as a tool against the propagation of violence. 
From an exogenous standpoint, CERP reconstruction projects can target the root 
causes of many of the grievances that motivate parts of the population to gravitate toward 
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collective violent contention as a means of survival. Upon the interrogation of more than 
100 Taliban and other radicalists in Afghanistan, Ambassador Ronald Neumann was 
briefed by the U.S. military that the reasons why these fighters supported the Taliban had 
little to do with religious ideology, but rather bad government and economics.58 One of 
the four components of the “perfect storm” that LTG Karl Eikenberry attributed to the 
resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan was the lag of planning and implementation of 
critical infrastructure reconstruction.59 My first independent variable—the characteristics 
of CERP reconstruction projects, which consists of prioritization based on how much a 
particular village or neighborhood needs a project and how much the village or 
neighborhood deserves the project, is designed to target the exogenous factors of 
contentious collective action. 
From an endogenous standpoint, the ability of messages accompanying 
reconstruction projects to discredit insurgent strategic frames, which are often centered 
on the poor quality of basic services, gives these projects strength. While the physical 
reconstruction projects should directly address the root of popular grievances, the 
messages should seek to directly discredit the enemy frames. McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald (1996) define strategic frames as conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion shared understandings of themselves and the world that legitimate and motivate 
collective action.60 Frames can be diagnostic, prognostic or motivational for a movement 
to achieve their desired effect in the progression toward collective action.61 My second 
independent variable—CERP project message resonance is designed to counter enemy 
movement strategic frames.  
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In a fight against insurgents, counterinsurgents have become painfully aware that 
non-lethal methods are potentially more important than lethal methods. In post-conflict 
environments, CERP reconstruction efforts can be applied in such a manner that they 
contribute to the diffusion of the incubation and growth of insurgencies. This section will 
present the key argument of this thesis and the model that will be used to identify if and 
how much reconstruction influences insurgency. It will explain the components of the 
model and the variables used to operationalize the argument.  
One could look to the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq to analyze precisely how 
much reconstruction efforts have lessened the strength of the insurgencies, however, such 
measurements would be fundamentally flawed. To date, post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts have been applied sub-optimally; particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. This thesis 
argues that CERP can significantly influence social movements in the post-conflict 
environment. Specifically, the probability of successful reconstruction efforts is a 
function of the characteristics of reconstruction projects and the accompanying message 
resonance. The utility of reconstruction efforts is intimately intertwined with the diffusion 
of insurgency. 
Commanders should approach CERP funded reconstruction projects from a 
standpoint that capitalizes on the underlying incentive the projects provide. In reality, a 
dollar spent in one geographic area is not equal to a dollar spent in another area due to the 
dynamics of the insurgent environment. Optimal application would seek to produce the 
“biggest bang for the buck” with respect to the effects created through project 
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Edward O’Connell believe that reconstruction has no effect on counterinsurgent violence 
is because the projects have been prioritized improperly, thus providing seemingly 
minimal positive benefits.63  
1. The Model 
My argument holds that projects should be prioritized based on a relationship 
between how much people of a particular area need certain reconstruction projects and 
how much they deserve to have those projects actualized. The level of analysis is at the 
village/neighborhood level, where CERP reconstruction projects can be used to precisely 
impact popular support. The needs are determined based on the assessed status of needs 
and a population’s perception of the value they place on various needs based on 
Maslow’s hierarchy. The deserve component is determined based on a combination of a 
village/neighborhood’s actions and attitudes. The combination of these two factors helps 
determine the level of the population’s support toward the counterinsurgency. Finally, the 
messages accompanying a project will determine the strength of the project’s effect on 
combating the movement. Figure 2.3 is a graphical depiction of the argument. 
 
Figure 2.3. Argument 
 2.  IV1: CERP Project Characteristics 
a. IV1.1: Needs 
The needs of one village or neighborhood are obviously almost always 
different than another village or neighborhood. Additionally, the residents of those 
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locations could perceive the value of their needs at different levels. In low-intensity and 
post-conflict societies, Maslow’s Physiological and Safety needs are typically unfulfilled. 
Analysis of an indigenous society’s perception and prioritization of physiological/safety 
needs is paramount in determining how to weight the incentive of reconstruction. For 
example, Figure 2.4 depicts the priority of needs for Kirkuk Iraqis. 
 
Figure 2.4. Example Weighted Priority of Needs for Kirkuk Iraqis64 
The needs are weighted from the bottom, with food and water being the 
most important at a value of four, and roads/bridges, schools and communications being 
least important with a value of one. For this research, the Tier of needs, or TN, can take on 
a value from most important to least important of 4-1, as depicted in the hierarchy above. 
Every project should seek to maximize the incentive value that resides at the project 
location based on the hierarchy of needs. It is critical to note that the hierarchy may vary 
by village/neighborhood—the better the population is known from the bottom up, the 
more accurately the indigenous priority of needs can be assessed—and the stronger the 
incentive of projects will be. The use of indigenous forces to provide perspective in this 
regard is extremely valuable. 
                                                 




Knowing how an indigenous society values their needs is critical; 
however, it is only part of the solution. A ground truth assessment is also needed for each 
village to determine the actual status of basic needs. The status of a particular need can 
range from non-existent with a value of four, to 100% operational with a value of one—
meaning those services in the worst shape are weighted the highest and those in the best 
shape are weighted the lowest. This ground truth estimate can be completed in the form 
of a village assessment. [See Appendix A] Thus, the Assessed status of a village or 
neighborhood’s needs, or AN, can take on a value from worst to best of 4–1. Again, the 
perspective indigenous forces can provide in this regard is extremely valuable.  
In summary, the mathematical representation of a village’s needs could be 
understood as follows: TN*AN, where TN represents the Tier of the need represented in 
the weighted hierarchy with values 4–1 (most important to least important), and AN 
represents the Assessed status of services in a particular village or neighborhood with 
values 4–1 (worst condition to best condition).  
b. IV1.2: Deserves 
To date, most CERP projects are completed simply based on the “need” 
component; and even then only the assessed need (AN). Not only do the projects need to 
be weighted based on their level of indigenous perceived prioritization, but projects 
should seek to maximize the incentive value that resides differently at every location. As 
Kriesberg (2007) states, “The conventional understanding among many partisans and 
observers of conflicts is that [violent] coercion is needed to induce an adversary to 
change its will.”65 This type of thinking is absent of the recognition of the importance of 
the population, especially in the three countries where CERP available. Kriesberg posits 
three types of inducements or incentives: coercion, reward, and persuasion.66 The use of 
CERP reconstruction projects directly contributes to the reward incentive. Commanders 
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in possession of CERP funds have the ability to incentivize popular support by rewarding 
those villages or neighborhoods who deserve reconstruction projects.  
The Iraq CERP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) book is entitled 
Money as a Weapon System. Although the purpose of CERP as stated in the book is little 
more than to provide urgent humanitarian relief and job creation, CERP truly does exist 
as a potential “weapon” or a tool in gaining the support of the population. With the 
primary mission of combatant commanders being the provision of security and stability, 
CERP should be used as a tool toward achieving the desired end state of greater security 
and stability. The portion of the population from which a commander can achieve the 
greatest amount of positive effects in terms of gaining security and stability is represented 
in the “Area of Focus” portion of Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5. The Spectrum of Popular Support and Area of Focus for CERP 
Reconstruction 
Passive supporters of the movement constitute the portion of the 
population that CERP can most beneficially affect. Therefore, the measures for 
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optimization should be weighted based on the probability that a particular project will 
gain support from this part of the population. The portion of the population closer to the 
mid-line is weighted higher (1). Those closer to being active supporters of the insurgency 
are less likely to support counterinsurgents and thus receive a low score (0).  
Clearly, the need to provide basic needs and services exists at all levels 
and once support is gained by a certain population, it is vital that the support is 
maintained. To gain support, CERP money should be focused on that portion of the 
population where support does not already exist. This reasoning does not marginalize 
maintenance of support from that portion of the population on the bottom half of figure 
2.5, it simply focuses the spending of CERP as a tool against a movement. There are 
numerous other funds that can and should be focused toward support maintenance. I-
CERP (Iraqi-CERP which are funds nearly identical to CERP but delegated to Iraqi 
Security Forces), provincial and donor funds should all be tied into support maintenance. 
Support maintenance projects should target Maslow’s higher level belonging, esteem and 
psychological needs, as the safety and physiological needs would likely already have 
been fulfilled. 
It is important to note that although CERP funds should be focused toward 
gaining support of the part of the population mentioned above, commanders must 
maintain the flexibility to quickly draw on CERP to prevent a village or neighborhood’s 
migration back across the center line in support of a movement. Situations such as this 
and “flashpoint” situations, in which a commander may have greater positive effects by 
adjusting his prioritization of projects to resolve a dispute of an immediate nature, 
demonstrate the kind of elasticity that must be present to ensure success.  
Bruce Gilley uses the terms “Actions” and “Attitudes” as indicators of a 
population’s perception of state legitimacy.67 The terms also provide a useful way to 
think about how much a village or neighborhood deserves to receive CERP 
reconstruction assistance based on their level of support for a movement. Determining 
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where a village/neighborhood falls on the spectrum of popular support (Figure 2.5) is a 
difficult task. Several factors contribute to the willingness of a population to support 
insurgents or counterinsurgents. This research analyzes seven components, three for  
actions and four for attitudes. The components were derived as a function of 
hypothesized representation and data availability. They are presented here and expanded 
upon in Chapter III. 
Actions are comprised of: the level penetration of “Bad guys” into a 
village/neighborhood (BAC), the amount of tips that a village/neighborhood provides to 
governmental or security forces (TAC) and the SIGACTs in a village/neighborhood (SAC). 
Attitudes are comprised of: surveyed confidence in the Criminal justice system (CAT), the 
abilities of the Government (GAT), the ability of the local Army (AAT), and the ability of 
the local police forces (PAT). The proper consideration of all seven components and the 
appropriate weighting of the components is fundamental to the maximization of the 
incentive nature of CERP projects through the provision to that part of the population 
most deserving.   
Thus, the mathematical representation of where a village/neighborhood 
falls on the spectrum of popular support (Figure 2.5) could be depicted as follows:  
Actions            *         Attitudes 
(BAC + TAC + SAC) * (GAT + CAT + AAT + PAT) 
The true value of reconstruction as it relates to social movements 
according to the mathematical representation noted above will prove extremely beneficial 
for the drawing of prescriptive implications in post-conflict societies. The final 
multiplication of IV1.1 and IV1.2 will produce an output in the form of a prioritized list 
of reconstruction projects that balances the needs and level of popular support of a 
village/neighborhood to provide a commander with the greatest positive effects that 
capitalize on the incentive nature of the projects. Additionally, the power of the message 
that accompanies reconstruction projects provides the potential for even greater effects. 
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3. IV2: Message Resonance 
The message that accompanies a particular reconstruction project can be 
extremely powerful and should be considered a required component for project 
completion. With regard to low-intensity or post-conflict environment, the message refers 
to information that is transmitted from the counterinsurgent to a receiver either verbally 
or nonverbally. The receiver, or target, of the message can vary depending on the effects 
one is trying to achieve. It can be argued that a moderate project with an excellent 
message is better than an excellent project with no message. Getting the word out about 
project planning, construction and completion is extremely valuable to negating all stages 
of movement progression. The incentive value of reconstruction projects—especially 
CERP projects can be used to affect parts of the population other than just those receiving 
the physical benefits of the project, thus achieving the desired trickledown effect with 
surrounding villages and neighborhoods.  
The degree to which a message resonates within and without the target population 
determines how much the CERP project characteristics (IV1) will be compounded, and 
ultimately the probability of project success. Identification of the target population, 
message validity and the identification of movement strategic frames are the critical 
components of message resonance. The target population varies based on Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6. Target Populations for Message Resonance 
The recipients of a particular project should be selected based on the probability 
that the project will gain their support, and thus represent the primary target group for the 
message. Messages targeting the “fence sitters” will occur at the micro-level, 
demonstrating how the project will impact the lives of those in the village in very real 
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terms. Another reason those physically affected by the project are the primary targets of 
the message is because these people will actually feel the results of the project. Messages 
with these people will resonate to a very high degree based on the fact that they are 
actually experiencing the results of the project. 
Further from the center of the circle, the secondary ring consists of surrounding 
villages or nearby neighborhoods that are also likely to physically see the results of 
project completion. The intent of the message targeting these groups is to penetrate into 
the deeper, more unsupportive portions of the population in a persuasive manner. 
Recipients of these meso-level messages have not yet had their needs satisfied to the 
degree of those where the project was completed. Visual recognition of project 
completion means messages will resonate to a certain degree if the message well depicts 
the relationship between the preferred behavior of the project recipients and project 
construction.  
The tertiary message recipient is the population at large. These macro-messages 
consist more of pictures in newspapers and on TV in an attempt to make progress as 
visible as possible to that portion of the population that is further from the center. Those 
affected by this message will come from all strata on the spectrum of popular support. 
The central theme of these messages is progression and reward for positive behavior. 
Management of the message by counterinsurgents is critical in maximizing the persuasive 
effects of a reconstruction project.  
The final target group of the message is the insurgent or opponent. Messages that 
target this group should seek to directly discredit those diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational frames that the insurgent is using to perpetuate collective action in that 
geographic area. An understanding the target populations that messages accompanying 
reconstruction projects affect assists in depicting how the projects contribute to the 
counterinsurgency. 
When considering how a message can benefit CERP reconstruction, it is 
important to acknowledge the need for message validity. When messages are 
communicated in low-intensity or post-conflict environments, the trust of the population 
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is something that cannot afford to be misguided. Each time interaction occurs between 
counterinsurgents (and insurgents, but to a lesser degree) and the population, an 
expectation is developed. If counterinsurgents fail to meet those expectations, trust is lost 
or degraded.  
The identification of movement strategic frames can most effectively be 
accomplished through four methods: Presence, Organizational mechanisms (Debriefs, 
meeting minutes, centralized database, etc.), indigenous force perspective, and 
surveys/assessments.  
The message capitalizes on the rewarding nature (incentive) of the project for the 
recipients, as well as the persuasive inducement for those that have the potential to also 
receive reconstruction benefits. There is no formal mechanism to ensure that appropriate 
messages accompany reconstruction projects and to target specific recipients for the 
various purposes necessary to contribute to the diffusion of social movements. Therefore, 
reconstruction projects are often not nearly as effective as they could be in affecting the 
insurgency. While the physical effects of reconstruction projects can be applied in such a 
manner to maximize their rewarding inducement, the messages accompanying these 
projects are extremely valuable in maximizing the persuasive power of the project. 
F. METHODOLOGY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS STUDY 
The remainder of this thesis will unpack the elements of this argument and test 
them with real world data. Chapter III will discuss the components of IV1 in detailed 
fashion. It provides background and justification for the variables used and demonstrates 
their necessity. Chapter IV expands on the details of IV2 and the role the message plays 
with regard to reconstruction. This chapter will discuss the current reactive nature of 
counterinsurgent messages and provide justification for the necessity of IV2 in the 
argument. Chapter V will present a case study of Kirkuk, Iraq to evaluate the 
effectiveness and validity of the model. I use Kirkuk as the case study because of the 
large amount of data I accumulated in 2006/2007 and flow of data I continue to receive 
from contacts in Kirkuk. Additionally, due largely to Article 140 of the Iraqi 
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Constitution, Kirkuk remains a potential hotbed for future insurgent activity. Analysis of 
this data through the model mentioned previously will provide empirics to determine if 
money spent on CERP is really effective in combating insurgency. Finally, Chapter VI 
will present the key findings, implications and recommendations. 
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III: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CERP RECONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS 
In the previous chapter, I established that successful reconstruction efforts in low-
intensity and post-conflict environments are those which are applied in such a manner 
that they contribute to the neutralization of the incubation and growth of potentially 
violent social movements. The hypothesis of this research argues the probability that 
reconstruction efforts will be successful is dependent on the characteristics of 
reconstruction projects (IV1) compounded by the accompanying message resonance 
(IV2). The level of analysis is the village or neighborhood level, because this is the level 
at which the results of a CERP reconstruction project will be felt by all, and also the level 
at which commanders can most effectively influence behavior.  
The focus of this chapter will be on the exogenous factors68 with regard to social 
movement theory—chiefly grievances. It presents those components that are necessary to 
analyze if CERP reconstruction projects can be used to target the root causes of the 
grievances that motivate parts of the population to gravitate toward collective violent 
contention as a means of survival. The importance of CERP in this regard cannot be 
overstated. Jones (2009) describes poverty, corruption and poor governance as the top 
reasons the Afghanistan population is attracted to insurgency. In a 2006 joint paper 
produced by the Afghan government, the United States and other international actors the 
authors concluded widespread poverty and the lack of essential services in rural areas 
“make people more susceptible to indoctrination and mean that the life of a fighter may 
be the only attractive option available.”69 My first independent variable (IV1)—the 
characteristics of CERP reconstruction projects, which consists of prioritization based on  
 
 
                                                 
68 See Figure 2.2 for a comprehensive list of potential exogenous contributors. 




how much a particular village or neighborhood needs a project and how much the village 
or neighborhood deserves the project, is designed to target the exogenous factors of 
contentious collective action. 
The remainder of this chapter will unpack the components of CERP 
reconstruction project characteristics or IV1, which is comprised of two major 
components: Needs and Deserve. The Needs are broken down into two sub-components: 
assessed needs (An) and how the people of a village/neighborhood value their needs (Tn). 
The Deserve component is broken down into two sub-components: Actions and 
Attitudes. Actions are comprised of the penetration of “Bad guys” into a village or 
neighborhood (BAC); Tips, which are hotline phone calls or walk-ins notifying 
counterinsurgents of enemy activity (TAC); and Significant Actions (SIGACTs) in a 
village or neighborhood (SAC). Attitudes consist of surveyed effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system (CAT), surveyed effectiveness of the Government (GAT), and surveyed 
effectiveness of the local Security Forces, both Army and Police (SAT). The results of the 
needs component will demonstrate who needs what the most. The results of the deserve 
component will determine where a particular village lies on the spectrum of popular 
support (Figure 2.5)—do their actions and attitudes demonstrate they are more supportive 
of insurgents or counterinsurgents and where do we draw the line to determine who 
receives projects considering the resulting effects that will be garnered. The output of 
both the needs and deserve components will be a prioritized list, with those villages or 
neighborhoods that will produce the greatest results in terms of gaining popular support 
listed at the top. 
A. A NOTE ON CERP 
Absent the Corps of Engineers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program is the only source of money available to 
ground level military commanders. There is concern on what the purpose of CERP 
should be. Following approval of the CPA, FRAGO 89 was published on June 19, 2003 
enabling commanders to “respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 
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requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will 
immediately assist the Iraqi people…”70 As the program has evolved with intentionally 
liberal guidelines for use, inefficiencies and abuses have become apparent—sometimes 
creating negative effects. On July 15, 2009, Representative John Murtha, Chairman of the 
House Appropriations defense sub-committee, wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates stating that “A fundamental review of CERP, its purposes, use and scope, is 
long overdue.”71 This letter came after the newly opened Caravan Hotel in Baghdad was 
looted of televisions, computers and furniture as coalition forces turned the completed 
CERP project over to Iraqi officials. As some officials feared, the availability of the funds 
to commanders may actually be too wide. The title of the CERP standard operating 
procedure manual for U.S. security forces is “Money as a Weapon System,” however, 
under the purpose for the utilization of CERP funds it only mentions humanitarian relief 
and employment generation.72 There is absolutely no mention of the influence of CERP 
expenditure on the security environment. There are, however, those who have realized 
the value of using CERP funds for reconstruction, such as General Peter Chiarelli, and 
the utilization of the program has evolved to support more than just immediate, small-
scale provisions. In congruence with Helmus, Paul, and Glenn (2007), the written 
guidance of the most commanders in Iraq now states that CERP is to be used by 
commanders as a tool to gain positive effects in the area of operations.73 
CERP is the type of reconstruction this research focuses on because of the ability 
it provides military commanders in influencing the security environment. With the 
primary responsibility of security in low-intensity and post-conflict environments, 
commanders possess CERP funds as a resource toward achieving the same end. Security 
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and development are clearly interdependent and CERP should be used in a manner that 
capitalizes on this interdependency. Most reconstruction practitioners will hesitate to 
fully implement their reconstruction apparatus until the security environment becomes 
permissive. CERP defeats this problem and in the early stages of intervention, it is the 
most available and potentially most effective source of reconstruction funding. 
B. THE PRIORITIZATION OF NEEDS 
As presented in the previous chapter, there has been a vast amount of research 
dedicated to the prioritization of reconstruction projects. Lindberg (2008) developed a 
“Critical Infrastructure Portfolio Selection” to weigh project costs and construction risks 
in line with military lines of operation (LOO’s). Timilsina (2006) used cases of post-
conflict reconstruction in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Haiti to evaluate the effectiveness 
of reconstruction prioritization through lessons learned and developed a framework for 
the future application of the lessons learned.74 However, the research conducted in these 
cases, and many similar others, are focused narrowly on the provision of reconstruction 
and the most efficient, market minded optimization for such efforts. Put more simply, 
they attempt to provide the largest amount of people with resources as possible with the 
minimal amount of money possible. The prioritization of reconstruction may be 
significantly more complicated, and in the case of CERP reconstruction, the prioritization 
is arguably more important due to the intimacy spending has with the security 
environment. The careful application of reconstruction projects, as with all decisions 
made by a commander, fully takes into account all the ancillary positive and negative 
effects of project construction types and location. The positive effects mentioned here are 
those concerning an increase in the quality of life of the indigenous population, but also 
those effects that influence the security environment.  
This section discusses the sub-components of the needs component. Needs is broken 
down into two sub-components: the assessed needs of a village/neighborhood (An) and the 
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importance a village/neighborhood places on a particular need according to Maslow (Tn). A 
compounding of these sub-components will most truly depict how much a village needs 
projects and how much they feel like they need projects. Let us first unpack An. 
1. Assessment of Needs (An) 
Knowledge Management is a key to understanding and exists to help 
commanders make informed, timely decisions despite the complexity 
inherent in stability operations.75 
—The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual (FM3-07) 
Understanding is a fundamental component to planning. In planning for the 
manipulation of the security environment, assessing the needs of a target population is a 
relatively obvious, yet essential task in developing an understanding. The assessment is 
something that is foundationally necessary for both civilian reconstruction agencies and 
security forces. The actual conduct of the assessment is minimally resource intensive. 
Assessing a village or neighborhood requires little more than visual evaluation, or at most 
brief solicitation from the population. Security forces are quite good at assessing what the 
people of a village or neighborhood need, when they conduct assessments. Realistically, 
however, most coalition force units will not consider assessing the needs of a village or 
neighborhood a top priority. The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that 
the development of plans and decision making is facilitated through an understanding of 
the operational environment.76 The manual then discusses several tools that can be used 
to assist in a commander’s understanding of the operational environment. A standard 
village assessment is not one of those tools. As was established previously, security and 
development are interdependent. The complexity of low-intensity conflict environments 
significantly blurs the lines between these two functions. Thus, the assessed status of a 
village or neighborhood perhaps should be of concern for security forces.  
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Essential services prove quite easy to assess because it is not typically necessary 
to engage in dialogue to determine a status. Several worksheets are available to quickly 
and effectively record statuses on the degree to which an essential service works or on the 
condition of a structure; which could actually be a problem. While different forms of 
assessments may lead to similar answers, they may not promote continuity across the 
range of agencies involved in reconstruction.  
Appendix A contains an example village assessment form. It was adapted from a 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers infrastructure reconnaissance assessment form.77 The 
status of a particular need can range from non-existent with an assigned weight of four, to 
100% operational with an assigned weight of one—meaning those services in the worst 
shape are weighted the highest and those in the best shape are weighted the lowest. Thus, 
the Assessed status of a village or neighborhood’s needs, or An, can take on a value from 
worst to best of 4-1. In Appendix A, the statuses are represented left to right from best to 
worst. A snapshot is shown here in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Sample of Village Assessment Form 
                                                 
77 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The SWEAT/IR Book: Infrastructure Reconnaissance (Ft Leonard 
Wood, MO: USAES, 2005), 18–19.  
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Note that the village assessment in Appendix A contains two basic categories: the 
first half is on the status of basic essential services and the second half is on the 
atmospherics and attitudes of village personnel, as well as specific village data 
(population size and ethnicity, number of houses, # employed, etc.). These questions can 
fluctuate to gain insight on various topics of concern for a commander and will be 
covered in more detail upon discussion of the deserve component of IV1. This particular 
village assessment has a total of 30 questions to evaluate the status of needs. Each 
question can receive a score from 1–4 and subsequently, each village or neighborhood 
receives a total combined An score that can range from 30–120. A higher score is 
indicative of a village or neighborhood more in need. Next, it is necessary to determine 
how a village/neighborhood values their needs. 
2. The Value of Needs (Tn) 
It can be difficult for the counterinsurgent to fully understand the priority of needs 
for a different culture, as many needs are circumstantial. For example, Iraqis would likely 
view electricity as more important than complete security or public safety, especially 
since their history has forced them to become accustomed to violence. It is extremely 
important to note that not all villages or neighborhoods in a certain geographic area may 
perceive their needs with the same importance. Again, in developing a comprehensive 
understanding of the local people, the population must be queried to enable a commander 
to maximize the incentive value of each action. 
As previously discussed, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs demonstrates the priority 
of human needs.78 Most low-intensity and post-conflict societies lack the most basic of 
needs: physiological and safety. Analysis of an indigenous society’s perception and 
prioritization of physiological/safety needs is paramount in determining how to weight 
the incentive of reconstruction. 
                                                 
78 See Figure 2.1. 
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The value of using indigenous perception in the prioritization of needs resides in 
the incentive nature of reconstruction projects. With the argued goal of CERP 
reconstruction projects being the influence of a target population through fund 
expenditure, understanding how a population places value on the various needs will 
provide insight on how to most significantly influence the target population. Put simply: 
we must maximize incentive. The more the characteristics of the village or neighborhood 
are understood, the more incentive can be generated. Another look at Figure 2.4, from 
Chapter II, demonstrates the Kirkuk, Iraqi point of view.  
The needs are tiered and weighted from the bottom, with food and water being the 
most important at a value of four, and roads/bridges, schools and communications being 
least important with a value of one. For this research, the Tier of needs, or Tn, can take on 
a value from most important to least important of 4–1, as depicted in Figure 2.4. Every 
project should seek to maximize the incentive value that resides at the project location 
based on the hierarchy of needs. It is critical to note that the hierarchy can vary by 
village/neighborhood and the value a village or neighborhood places on particular needs 
can vary over time due to external circumstances. The better the population is known 
from the bottom up, the more accurately the indigenous priority of needs can be assessed 
—and the stronger the incentive of projects will be.  
Figure 2.4. Example of Weighted Priority of Needs for Kirkuk Iraqis 
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With the village assessment shown in Appendix A, there are 30 questions that can 
each be weighted with a value from 1–4, with 4 being the most important in the eyes of 
the population. Again, it is possible that different villages or neighborhoods could place 
different values on the same needs. The appropriate sampling is necessary to ensure 
maximized effects. 
3. Summary of Needs Components 
Both components for determining the needs of a population, assessment and 
indigenous perception of value, are vital to the prioritization process. Reconstruction 
projects are often developed with minimal consideration of either component, especially 
at the CERP level where commanders have the liberal authority to spend as they deem 
necessary. Only through consideration of the compounding effect of both components 
will a commander be able to most effectively influence the local security environment 
and incentivize progress.  
The mathematical representation of a village’s needs is as follows:  
 
An represents the Assessed status of services in a particular village or 
neighborhood with values 4-1 (worst condition to best condition), and Tn represents the 
Tier of the need represented in the weighted hierarchy with values 4–1 (most important to 
least important). With the 30 questions in the village assessment presented in Appendix 
A, the numerical output range of village considering both An and Tn is from 30–480. This 
output will generate a numerically based list profiling those villages that are truly most in 
need to least in need. 
An accurate assessment and insight into the perceived value a population places 
on needs are necessary for prioritization, but they only constitute a portion of the 
equation. Again, the importance of CERP reconstruction projects resides in their ability 
to influence the security environment. Thus, in addition to the needs components 
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mentioned above, behavioral indicators of the current security environment are needed to 
determine the effects past reconstruction projects have had and predict how future 
projects may differently influence the future security environment.  
C. THE DESERVE COMPONENT 
Any condition or event which can be shown to have an effect upon 
behavior must be taken into account. By discovering and analyzing these 
causes we can predict behavior; to the extent that we can manipulate them, 
we can control behavior.79 
—B.F. Skinner, 1953 
Those involved in any type of warfare are fundamentally concerned with ways to 
understand, predict and control behavior. Security forces simply would not have a job if 
people behaved in a non-violent or non-threatening manner. An understanding of the 
operational environment, that both the U.S. Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations 
Field Manuals discuss, is critical because it enables a commander to most effectively 
control behavior. Lethal targeting is one method used to control extreme behavior. CERP 
reconstruction is another tool that can be used to control behavior, if it is applied 
properly. Helmus, Paul and Glenn (2007) argue this point well, stating that Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) and CERP funds can be used or withheld to encourage civilian 
behaviors that are key to counterinsurgency success.80  
This section presents those factors that serve as effective indicators for assessing 
where a village or neighborhood’s level of support lies on a spectrum between insurgents 
and counterinsurgents. It will first unpack the subcomponents reflective of a village’s 
actions, and then the subcomponents reflective of a village’s attitudes. The section  
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culminates with the interaction between actions and attitudes to determine where a village 
falls on the spectrum of popular support, and how the deserve component plays into the 
prioritization of reconstruction projects overall. 
To date, most CERP projects, and most types of reconstruction for that matter, are 
completed simply based on the need component; and even then only the assessed need 
(An). Not only do the projects need to be weighted based on their level of perceived 
indigenous prioritization, but projects should seek to maximize the incentive value that 
resides differently at every location. The role of incentive is powerful in determining the 
value a target population places on their needs, but it is even more powerful in the 
evaluation of how the provision of services will influence a target population to support 
or deny support for a potentially violent social movement.  
As Kriesberg (2007) states, “The conventional understanding among many 
partisans and observers of conflicts is that [violent] coercion is needed to induce an 
adversary to change its will.”81 This type of thinking is absent of the recognition of the 
importance of the population, especially in the three countries where CERP available. 
Kriesberg posits three types of inducements or incentives: coercion, reward, and 
persuasion.82 The use of CERP reconstruction projects directly contributes to the reward 
incentive. Commanders in possession of CERP funds have the ability to incentivize 
popular support by rewarding those villages or neighborhoods who deserve 
reconstruction projects.  
As already discussed, the Iraq CERP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) book is 
entitled Money as a Weapon System. Although the purpose of CERP as stated in the book 
is little more than to provide urgent humanitarian relief and job creation, CERP truly does 
have potential as a “weapon” or a tool in gaining the support of the population. With 
combatant commanders primarily concerned with security and stability, CERP should be 
used as a tool toward achieving the desired end state of greater security and stability. The 
                                                 
81 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 95. 
82 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 96. 
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portion of the population from which a commander can achieve the greatest amount of 
positive effects in terms of gaining security and stability was represented in the “Area of 
Focus” portion of Figure 2.5, shown again below. 
 
Figure 2.5. The Spectrum of Popular Support and Area of Focus for CERP 
Reconstruction. 
Passive supporters of the movement constitute the portion of the population that 
CERP can most beneficially affect. Therefore, the measures for optimization should be 
weighted based on the probability that a particular project will gain support from this part 
of the population. The portion of the population closer to the mid-line is weighted higher 
(1). Those closer to being active supporters of the insurgency are less likely to support 
counterinsurgents and thus receive a low score (0).  
Clearly, the need to provide basic needs and services exists at all levels and once 
support is gained by a certain population, it is vital that the support is maintained. 
However, to gain support, CERP money should be focused on that portion of the 
population where support does not already exist. This reasoning does not marginalize 
maintenance of support from that portion of the population on the bottom half of Figure 
2.5, it simply focuses the spending of CERP as a tool against insurgency. There are 
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numerous other funds that can and should be focused toward support maintenance. I-
CERP (Iraqi-CERP which are funds nearly identical to CERP but delegated to Iraqi 
Security Forces), provincial and donor funds should all be tied into support maintenance. 
Support maintenance projects should target Maslow’s higher level belonging, esteem and 
psychological needs, as the safety and physiological needs would likely already have 
been fulfilled. 
It is important to note that although CERP funds should be focused toward 
gaining support of the part of the population mentioned above, commanders must 
maintain the flexibility to quickly draw on CERP to prevent a village or neighborhood’s 
migration back across the center line in support of an insurgency. Situations such as this 
and other “flashpoint” concerns, in which a commander may have greater positive effects 
by adjusting his prioritization of projects to resolve a dispute of an immediate nature, 
demonstrate the kind of elasticity that must be present to ensure success.  
1. Sub-Components of the Deserve Component 
Bruce Gilley uses the terms Actions and Attitudes as indicators of a population’s 
perception of state legitimacy.83 The terms also provide a useful way to think about how 
much a village or neighborhood deserves to receive CERP reconstruction assistance 
based on their level of support for a movement. The following sections will unpack the 
indicators for village’s Actions and Attitudes. The proper consideration of all applicable 
indicators and the appropriate weighting of the indicators is crucial to maximizing the 
incentive nature of CERP projects through the provision to that part of the population 
most deserving.   
a. Actions 
There are three sub-components that frame the Action component: the 
penetration of “bad guys” into a village or neighborhood (BAC), the amount of tips that a 
                                                 
83 Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 13. 
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village or neighborhood provides to governmental or security forces (TAC) and SIGACTs 
in or around a village or neighborhood (SAC). These sub-components are in order of 
hypothesized weight, with the BAC being the most important with a value of (3) and the 
SAC being the least important with a value of (1). However, the model will evaluate the 
weighting of each of these factors differently to determine applicability. BAC, TAC and 
SAC fall between the value of (0) and (1).  
BAC is determined through link analysis, wherein High Value Individuals 
(HVIs) and emerging HVIs are linked to their base of support. This element demonstrates 
the necessity of cross agency coordination and information sharing. The intelligence 
apparatus is a valuable contribution to the proper prioritization of CERP reconstruction 
projects. Data in this regard can emerge through numerous conduits, but should be 
properly filtered through formal intelligence channels to ensure the highest degree of 
validity. Once this data is in hand, it is difficult to refute intelligence depicting villages or 
neighborhoods that harbor and support HVIs and potential HVIs. BAC is numerically 
derived in this research based on three separate and non-redundant data sets: the U.S. 
Brigade top 15 HVIs, U.S. Brigade Emerging HVIs, and Iraqi Army HVIs. These data 
sets are weighted from first to last in order of importance. The current top 15 HVIs are 
listed as more of a threat to security than the emerging HVIs, who are more of a threat 
than the Iraqi Army HVIs. Again, no one individual falls into more than one category.  
TAC is determined through data acquired by Joint Security Stations (JSSs), 
Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs) and coalition or indigenous force personnel. Each of 
these entities operates a “hotline” to which anonymous callers can report suspicious 
activity. Additionally, each of these entities receives “walk-ups” where civilians will 
casually inform security forces of suspicious activity. This data represents a particular 
population’s willingness to share information with governmental or security forces. 
Those villages that are more willing to share information about the security environment 





The tips data have one major—information on the reliability of tips is not available. An 
ideal dataset would consider the number of tips and reliability of those tips to truly 
indicate a village’s level of support. 
SAC is determined through U.S. and indigenous security force data on 
Significant Actions. Every SIGACT in combat areas is recorded in as much detail as 
possible to allow for trend identification and further analysis. SIGACTs are an important 
sub-component, as trends can show violence “hotspots” where violent movements are 
permitted by the population to conduct anti-government operations. This is the variable 
that is most often looked at with regard to any establishment of a cause and effect 
relationship. Commanders and academics alike often gauge a decision on how it affects 
subsequent SIGACTs. This research uses Iraq SIGACT data from January 2004—
October 2009. SIGACTs are linked to the nearest village or neighborhood to show a 
population’s willingness to support or accept violence.  
BAC, TAC, and SAC are all in the form of numbers per village. To analyze 
the combined effect of these factors, they must be mathematically transformed through 
some form of normalization. In the study of quantitative strategic decision making, 
Kirkwood (1997) developed an evaluation measure to overcome the problem of differing 
units used for measurement when multiple criteria are involved.84 This process creates an 
output that is not the actual evaluation measure score that each sub-component received, 
but rather the proportion of the way along the allowed range of that evaluation measure 
scale where the score for the sub-component lies.85 The formula used for an evaluation 
measure where higher scores are more preferred is as follows: 
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Likewise, for an evaluation measure where lower scores are preferred (like 
SIGACTs) the following formula is used to calculate the normalized value. 
 
Figure 3.2 serves as an example for determining the normalized value for 
SIGACTs. In the case of SIGACTs, a lower value is more preferred. Thus, Equation (2) 
above will be used. In this case, let us consider six fictitious villages with the following 
number of SIGACTs: 2, 15, 135, 142, 188, and 211. To determine the normalized value 
[  for the fourth village, we run the raw number (142) through Equation (2) above. 
The result (0.33) is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Graphical Depiction of Normalization Process 
Following the normalization of all the Action (ACT) sub-components, it is 
assumed that all sub-components are of equal weight. Subsequently, SIGACTs would be 
represented with the same value as HVIs. This becomes problematic for analysis and 
determining which factors are most telling. Thus, the use of weights is preferred to 
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determine which factors are actually most influential. Each sub-component will receive a 
weight and the sum of all weights will equal 1. The weights for each sub-component are 
varied to determine which weighting produces the most influential outcome. The final 
form of the equation for Actions (ACT) is as follows. 
 
 
The actions of a village or neighborhood go a long way in determining 
their level of popular support. While these three Action sub-components are necessary, 
they are not sufficient in the analysis of how CERP reconstruction projects will affect a 
population. Further consideration in the category of attitudinal indicators is needed. 
b. Attitudes 
The attitudes component consists of four sub-components for most 
effectively gauging the average attitude of a village or neighborhood. For this research, 
the attitudes are derived from the same village assessments that were used for evaluating 
needs. The attitude component (AT) consists of: surveyed confidence in the Criminal 
justice system (CAT), the confidence in the abilities of the Government (GAT), the ability 
of the local Army (AAT) and the ability of local police forces (PAT). The village 
assessments use a scale of (4) to (1) to rank the opinions of a population with regard to 
their confidence in the abilities of each of the entities. A score of (1) means a village has 
complete confidence and a (4) means they have no confidence. In other words, a score of 
(1) means that the village perceives the criminal justice system, government or security 
forces as adequate.  
In the study of gang behavior, Akerlof (1997) stated that perception of 
fairness of the criminal justice system (lack of corruption, etc.), and attitudes toward local 
security and government officials concerning the criminal justice system significantly 
influence the willingness of a community to share information on gang (insurgent) 
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activities.86 The three indicators used to assess a population’s attitude in support of the 
deserve component of this research are designed to assess the willingness of a community 
to share information. 
The first sub-component, CAT is an extremely important consideration. A 
particular population is only going to share information on violent social movement 
activity if they believe that the criminal justice system is capable of protecting them from 
the individuals they shared information on. If an insurgent is arrested and then released 
because of corruption or some other reason, retribution is going to be one of the 
insurgent’s top priorities. This becomes even more important with higher level, more 
powerful criminals. The cost to benefit ratio for a villager is of constant consideration. An 
assessment of the CAT sub-component helps determine if a village or neighborhood would 
share critical information if they were able. 
GAT is the surveyed confidence in the elected government – local, 
provincial and national. A population’s satisfaction with the government links directly 
back to basic counterinsurgency and social movement literature. If a population possesses 
a grievance, or has experienced some sort of social injustice or repression, they are more 
likely to support an opposing strategy. An insurgency that steps in with aims to oppose 
the existing governmental norms will gain support from such disaffected populations. 
Thus, a village or neighborhood’s level of confidence in the elected government is 
indicative of their willingness to support them. 
Finally, AAT and PAT reflect a population’s perception of both the Army 
and Police forces in their area. The Army and Police are those authority figures that 
villagers are most likely to come into contact with and also those who are primarily 
responsible for local security. If a village doesn’t have confidence in the abilities of those 
who are charged to protect them, they are going to put their support wherever necessary  
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Human Well Being and Economic Goals, 220–223 (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 222. 
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to ensure survival. The context determines if survival requires more active or passive 
support for either side. More confidence in security forces is thus indicative of higher 
willingness by a village to share information with them. 
CAT, GAT, AAT and PAT are all represented in numerical values of 1-4 
derived from the village assessments. To enable the compounding relationship between 
the Attitude (AT) sub-components and the Action (AC) sub-components, the AT 
components must be normalized and weighted in the same fashion exhibited with AT in 
the preceding section. An example normalization for CAT values from six villages with 
values 1, 2, 2, 2, 4, and 4 is shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3. Graphical Depiction of the AT Normalization Process 
Following the normalization of all the Attitude (AT) sub-components, the 
same consideration must be taken as with the weights on AC. All AT factors do not likely 
provide the exact same level of influence. Thus, the use of weights is again preferred to 
determine which factors are actually most influential. Each sub-component will receive a 
weight and the sum of all weights will equal 1. The weights for each sub-component are 
varied to determine which weighting produces the most influential outcome. The final 





2. Summary of Deserve Component  
When considering the combination of AC and AT, it is important to note that AC 
and AT themselves may influence the result differently and should thus also receive 
weights. The resulting mathematical representation of how much a village/neighborhood 








Equation 1. Deserve Indicator 
The results of this equation will determine where a village/neighborhood lies on 
the spectrum of popular support (Figure 2.5). The deserve component should be 
prioritized according to Figure 2.5, with those passive supporters of an insurgency 
receiving a higher priority. Those closer to being active supporters of the potentially 
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violent social movement will receive a lower priority, and therefore receive projects as a 
last resort. The results of this component, taken with respect to the needs component will 
have the most lucrative effects of CERP reconstruction projects on the security 
environment.  
D. SUMMARY 
The model presented here should be useful to determine the effects of CERP 
reconstruction projects on insurgency. Current research depicting the seemingly minimal 
effects of reconstruction on the security environment is resultant of the ineffective 
application of reconstruction projects. The prioritization of all reconstruction projects has 
largely failed to take into account the incentive value of the projects. The use of the 
indicators presented in this chapter is particularly important in this regard.  
The true value of reconstruction as it relates to insurgency according to the 
mathematical representations noted in this chapter will prove extremely beneficial for the 
drawing of prescriptive implications in post-conflict societies. Accurate collection of data 
on all four needs sub-components and all six deserve sub-components will provide the 
most formative understanding available for decision making. While all the characteristics 
of CERP reconstruction (IV1) presented in this chapter are necessary and important in 
understanding, predicting and controlling the behavior of a population, they do not by 
themselves determine the success of CERP reconstruction as defined in the introduction 
of this chapter. A second independent variable is necessary to counter enemy strategic 
frames that serve as the endogenous, transforming factors in a social movement’s 
progression toward violence. Harnessing the power of the message that accompanies 
reconstruction projects provides the potential for even greater effects. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE MESSAGE IN POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION 
The message that accompanies a particular reconstruction project can be 
extremely powerful and should be considered a required component for project 
completion. It can be argued that a moderate project with an excellent message is better 
than an excellent project with no message. Getting the word out about project planning, 
construction and completion is extremely valuable to negating all stages of movement 
progression. The incentive value of reconstruction projects—especially CERP projects 
can be used to affect parts of the population other than just those receiving the physical 
benefits of the project. This chapter provides insight into the importance of the message 
with regard to reconstruction and the potential areas for the progression of insurgency if 
the message is not applied properly.  
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the opportunities available for 
messages through CERP reconstruction. Next, it will analyze who the target audience of 
the message is and why. This chapter will then assess why the message is effective in 
combating an insurgency according to social movement theory. Social movement theory 
assists in depicting the importance of understanding enemy strategic frames to increase 
counterinsurgent message resonance. Finally, this chapter discusses how the potential for 
a message to spread with regard to reconstruction can be quantified for analytical 
application. The messages accompanying a project will determine the strength of the 
project’s effect on combating the movement. 
A. THE OPPORTUNITY: HOW DOES THE RECONSTRUCTION MESSAGE 
CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS? 
To understand the role the message plays with regard to reconstruction and its 
relationship with social movements, one must define the “message” and information 
operations (IO). With regard to an insurgent or low-intensity conflict environment, I 
define the message as information that is transmitted from the counterinsurgent to a 
64 
 
receiver either verbally or nonverbally. The receiver, or target, of the message can vary 
depending on the effects one is trying to achieve. According to the U.S. Army 
Information Operations Field Manual (3–13), information operations is the employment 
of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological 
operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information 
systems, and to influence decision making.87 Put more simply with regard to the 
message, information operations are those efforts that facilitate development, 
synchronization and distribution of messages. 
Based on the literature, one would posit that the message and IO do not relate 
much at all to reconstruction. However, the level of resonance of a message 
accompanying a reconstruction project directly affects the actions of surrounding 
populations. The actions (or inactions) of surrounding populations dictate how much they 
deserve to have their needs fulfilled.  
Very little emphasis has been placed on the role of information operations in 
contributing to reconstruction efforts. Counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, contributing 
author to the U.S. Army Field Manuals for Stability Operations (3–07) and 
Counterinsurgency (3–24), states that IO is the most important line of effort in a 
counterinsurgency.88 Information operations must be present in each line of effort for 
stability to be achieved and for the counterinsurgency to be successful. GEN Peter 
Chiarelli does arguably the best job at portraying the importance of IO in reconstruction:  
Shaping the message and tying that message to operations is as important, 
if not more so, to the desired individual effect as the previous five lines of 
operations. Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens 
of the Iraqi culture and psyche is a foremost planning consideration for 
every operation.89 
                                                 
87 U.S. Army, Information Operations (Washington: U.S. Army, 2003), iii. 
88 John Nagl, “Irregular Warfare,” Naval Postgraduate School, May 12, 2009. 
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GEN Chiarelli goes on to say that insurgents well know the value of information 
operations on counterinsurgency efforts. As stated previously, the message and 
information operations can contribute in a compounding manner to the perception of the 
population. 
1. Incentive/Inducements 
The incentive nature of reconstruction projects is what makes them so conducive 
to messages or information operations. As Kriesberg (2007) states, “The conventional 
understanding among many partisans and observers of conflicts is that [violent] coercion 
is needed to induce an adversary to change its will.”90 This point is echoed through the 
fact that coalition forces in Afghanistan refused to even acknowledge the insurgency as 
late as 2006. Unit commanders were actually told not to use the word counterinsurgency 
because they were only supposed to be conducting counterterrorist operations under the 
operational focus of fighting Al Qaeda.91 Thankfully, today there is a much better 
understanding that non-lethal methods can be used to assist in the fight against an 
insurgency. Reconstruction is one of those methods, and for maneuver commanders 
CERP exists as a means. 
There are three basic types of incentives or inducements: coercion, reward, and 
persuasion.92 Coercive inducements can be either threatened or applied and violent or 
nonviolent. Although all three types of inducements can occur simultaneously, more 
applicable to this situation are reward and persuasive inducements. Kriesberg indicates 
that offering a reward for compliance can be more effective and precise than punishing 
for noncompliance.93 Further, rewards are more likely to be effective in the later stages of 
a conflict than during periods of escalation. When used in conjunction with quality 
messaging, reward inducements can be quite persuasive. Persuasive inducements can 
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influence an opponent by communicating arguments, information or appeals to alter the 
other side’s perception of the conflict.94 When thinking of a social movement, it is easy 
to understand the value of reward and persuasive inducements, and the interplay between. 
Reconstruction efforts can be thought of as reward inducements and the accompanying 
messages contribute to the persuasive inducements. 
2. Message Validity 
Finally, when considering how a message/IO can benefit reconstruction, it is 
important to acknowledge the need for message validity. When messages are 
communicated at this stage of the fight, the trust of the population is something that 
cannot afford to be misguided. Each time interaction occurs between counterinsurgents 
(and insurgents, but to a lesser degree) and the population, an expectation is developed. If 
counterinsurgents fail to meet those expectations, trust is lost or degraded.  
The message and information operations are clearly applicable and valuable in 
reconstruction operations. Because reconstruction projects provide for the needs of the 
population, if prioritized properly, they carry with them an inherent incentive or 
inducement that can be used by counterinsurgents to reward or persuade popular 
behavior. On the contrary, poorly prioritized projects carry can be damaging. Upon the 
completion of a $74,000 playground in a Kirkuk, Iraq neighborhood, residents were 
pleased that their children had a place to play, buy confused as to why a playground was 
built when they didn’t have running water and raw sewage was running down both sides 
of the playground.95 Such a scenario provides lucrative ground for insurgents to mobilize 
contentious belief.  
B. THE TARGET AUDIENCE 
The message accompanying a reconstruction project will typically have multiple 
targets which can best be understood as concentric circles. Those at the center of the 
                                                 
94 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts, 99. 
95 This playground was built in the Tiseen neighborhood of Kirkuk city in 2007.  
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circles constitute the village or neighborhood where the reconstruction project is 
completed. Those further from the center are those villages/neighborhoods that 
geographically radiate from the project site. At the outer ring of the circles are those 
villages or neighborhoods that will only experience project completion through some 
form of television, newspaper or broad-based media.  
As stated in Chapter III, CERP projects should seek to gain support from the local 
population, which means that portion of the population from which support is not already 
possessed. Thus, counterinsurgents are not trying to gain support from the entire 
population, only the part that they don’t already have. Passive supporters of the 
insurgency constitute the portion of the population that CERP can most beneficially 
affect. Therefore, the measures for optimization should be weighted based on the 
probability that a particular project will gain support from this part of the population. The 
portion of the population closer to the mid-line is weighted higher (1), and those closer to 
being active supporters of the insurgency receive a low score (0).  
The recipients of a particular project should be selected based on the probability 
that the project will gain their support, and thus represent the primary target group for the 
message. The reason villages or neighborhoods receive these projects is because they are 
“fence sitters” and the project represents a reward inducement that, along with the 
persuasion created through the message will work to pull the group over to support the 
counterinsurgency (whether passively or actively). Messages targeting the fence sitters 
will occur at the micro-level, demonstrating how the project will impact the lives of those 
in the village in very real terms. Another reason those physically affected by the project 
are the primary targets of the message is because these people will actually see and feel 
the results of the project. Messages with these people will resonate to a very high degree 
based on the fact that they are actually experiencing the results of the project. 
Further from the center of the circle, the meso-level ring consists of surrounding 
villages or nearby neighborhoods that are also likely to physically talk about the results of 
project completion. The intent of the message targeting these groups is to penetrate into 
the deeper, more unsupportive portions of the population in a persuasive manner. 
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Recipients of these meso-level messages have not yet had their needs satisfied to the 
degree of those where the project was completed. Verbal and visual recognition of project 
completion means messages will resonate to a certain degree if the message well depicts 
the relationship between the preferred behavior of the project recipients and project 
construction.  
The macro-level message recipient is the population at large. These messages 
consist more of pictures in newspapers and on TV in an attempt to make progress as 
visible as possible to that portion of the population that is further from the center. Those 
affected by this message will come from all strata on the spectrum of popular support. 
The central theme of these messages is progression and reward for positive behavior. 
Management of the message by counterinsurgents is critical in maximizing the persuasive 
effects of a reconstruction project.  
The final target group of the message is the insurgent or opponent. Messages that 
target this group should seek to directly discredit those diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational frames that the insurgent is using to perpetuate collective action in that 
geographic area. After initial completion of a project, the project is at greatest risk for 
insurgent attack. Messages must be used not only to demonstrate to recipients how an 
attack by insurgents would impinge on their livelihood, but also potentially to invite 
insurgents to attack. Counterinsurgents would obviously need to take the appropriate 
security measures to safeguard the site, knowing the likelihood of attack. Actual attempts 
by insurgents to destroy something the project recipients have had a chance to taste or 
feel could help drive a wedge further between the insurgents and the population. An 
understanding the target populations that messages accompanying reconstruction projects 
affect assists in depicting how the projects contribute to the counterinsurgency. 
C. MESSAGE EFFECTIVENESS ACCORDING TO SMT 
Social movement theory is useful in analyzing the effectiveness of reconstruction 
messages in insurgencies. As stated previously, social movements ultimately seek to 
develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents based 
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on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames.96 As stated in 
Chapter II and shown in Figure 2.2, the ability of the message accompanying 
reconstruction project completion to resonate significantly contributes to the endogenous 
factors that transform contentious belief into violence. 
From an endogenous standpoint, the ability of messages accompanying 
reconstruction projects to discredit insurgent strategic frames, which are often centered 
on the poor quality of basic services, gives these projects strength. While the physical 
reconstruction projects should directly address the root of many popular grievances, the 
messages should seek to directly discredit the enemy frames. Strategic frames are 
conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of 
themselves and the world that legitimate and motivate collective action.97 Frames can be 
diagnostic, prognostic or motivational.98 Therefore, an understanding of current enemy 
frames is critical to maximize the success of messages.  
D. QUANTIFYING MESSAGE RESONANCE 
Determination of the extent to which the message accompanying a CERP 
reconstruction project will resonate is clearly context dependent. For this research, I 
analyze the phenomenon from the micro, meso and macro levels. These three levels with 
regard to CERP reconstruction can best be thought of according to the following 
classification: 
Micro—Will they see it? 
Meso—Will they talk about it? Maybe they don’t see it but their neighbors do. 
Macro—Will they hear about it, read about it, or watch it? 
                                                 
96 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2. 
97 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6. 
98 David Snow, Rens Vliegenthart, and Catherine Corrigal-Brown, “Framing the French Riots: A 
Comparative Study of Frame Variation,” Social Forces 86, no. 2 (2007): 387. 
70 
 
The remainder of this section will explain how numerical values for each of these 
levels of message resonance were determined and how the values were situated in the 
model. 
Population densities can be used to determine the extent to which the people of a 
village will see a project. Epidemiologists use population densities to measure the rate at 
which an epidemic will spread.99 Much like the spread of infectious disease, the denser a 
population, the more people there are available for infection and the more likely a 
message is to spread. Identification of the population density at each village will yield a 
value that will contribute to overall message resonance at the micro-level.  
For the meso-level analysis, the proximity of each village to every other village 
can be used to determine the likelihood that residents of one village would talk about 
CERP reconstruction projects with another village. It is, therefore, more likely that tightly 
clustered villages will have a higher exposure to the goings on of a nearby village or 
adjoining neighborhood than of a distant village. Subsequently, it is unlikely that news of 
a CERP project completed in a remote village will reach any other village or 
neighborhood. Thus, building a project in this location will not yield much in terms of 
influencing violence.  
The availability of media comprises quantification of the macro-level. Accurate 
identification of which media outlets are available and their respective distribution or 
footprint will determine how far the message will resonate at the macro-level. The most 
common forms of media are newspaper, television and radio. For newspapers, population 
sizes can be used to determine which villages will be recipients based on distribution 
levels. For example, local papers will be distributed to smaller local villages than regional 
and national newspapers. If the footprints of television and radio stations are known, 
                                                 
99 G.P. Garnett, “The geographical and temporal evolution of sexually transmitted disease epidemics,” 
Sexually Transmitted Infections: Phase Specific Strategies for the Prevention, from ProQuest Science 




buffers can be constructed to incorporate all villages that fall under this known distance. 
Such buffers must take into account the antenna height and elevation data.  
To assemble the results of the media data, each media outlet is given a value of 
one. If the media outlet was available to the village, the village will receive a score of one 
for that outlet. If not, the village received a zero. The sum of these scores will determine 
the extent to which a message will resonate at the macro-level. Villages with a higher 
score have greater access to media.  
Next, the outputs from the micro, meso and macro levels must be normalized in 
the same manner described in Chapter III. In all of these cases, a higher value is more 
preferred. Thus, the following equation will be used to normalize these values.  
 
The normalized values can subsequently be summed for a final IV2 output. The 
results of this output can then be compared to the IV1 values and the DV values for the 
drawing of prescriptive implications. 
E. SUMMARY 
With regard to reconstruction projects, the role of the message is extremely 
valuable. Through recognition of the incentive value of reconstruction projects, 
prioritization can occur based on the needs of the people as well as how much those 
people deserve to have their needs fulfilled. The level of resonance of a message 
accompanying a reconstruction project directly affects the actions of surrounding 
populations, which are what dictate how much they deserve to have their needs fulfilled. 
The message capitalizes on the rewarding nature (incentive) of the project for the 
recipients, as well as the persuasive inducement for those that have the potential to also 
receive reconstruction benefits. There is no formal mechanism to ensure that appropriate 
messages accompany reconstruction projects and to target specific recipients for the 
various purposes necessary to contribute to the counterinsurgency. Therefore, 
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reconstruction projects are often not nearly as effective as they could be in affecting the 
insurgency. While the physical effects of reconstruction projects can be applied in a 
better manner to maximize their rewarding inducement, the messages accompanying 
these projects are extremely valuable in maximizing the persuasive power of the project. 
The following chapter will use the At Tameem province of Iraq as a case to test how the 
needs, deserve, and message resonance components influence the dependent variable. 
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V. CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is, first, to identify if and how much CERP 
reconstruction has influenced the Iraq insurgency, and then to test a prioritization model 
to assess which variables most influence insurgency. This thesis uses the At Tameem, 
otherwise known as Kirkuk, province of Iraq as a case with which to empirically test the 
influence of CERP on insurgency.  
The At Tameem Province of Iraq is located in the northern part of Iraq, with the 
semi-autonomous Kurdistan region to the north and the Hamrin mountain range to the 
south. The province is ethnically diverse, populated with Kurds, Arabs, Turkomen, and 
Assyrian-Chaldeans.100 Roughly 40% of Iraq’s oil production comes from the At 
Tameem province. The capital city of Kirkuk is home to more than 1 million people and 
runs rampant with high unemployment and ethnic tension. For historical, political and 
economic reasons, the various ethnic groups continually compete for control of the 
governorate and the capital city of Kirkuk. Under Saddam Hussein, a process known as 
“Arabization” was used to purge the Kurds from the region. Hussein’s government paid 
Arabs to move from southern areas in Iraq to Kirkuk, where they occupied former Kurd 
homes and jobs. This process, when combined with more deadly atrocities committed by 
Hussein against the Kurds, significantly decreased the Kurdish population in the 
province. After the fall of Saddam, Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution called for a 
reversal of the Arabization process. Overnight, 20-year-old Arabs were assigned 
residency to areas in southern Iraq where they had never lived, because their parents were 
part of the original Arabization before the youngsters were born. Figure 5.1 provides an 
overview of the At Tameem province. 
                                                 
100 RTI International, “Local Economic Development: The At Ta’mim Experience,” Lessons Learned 




Figure 5.1. Map of Iraq and subset Northern Kurdish Region 
This historical context, when compounded with the current high numbers of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), high unemployment rates, poor stability and 
security, and the high economic potential of the Kirkuk oilfields, has created an 
extremely sensitive environment that could spark at any moment. Violence in the 
province remains significant and CERP expenditures continue to be made. Thus, the 
relationship between CERP and insurgency in the At Tameem province is ripe for 
analysis. 
B. PURPOSE AND DESIGN 
The null hypothesis of this case is that insurgency is not negatively influenced by 
CERP reconstruction. The purpose of this case study is to first, look at the localized 
Kirkuk insurgency and CERP reconstruction expenditures and determine if there is any 
relationship within. Secondly, this case will test the null hypothesis and examine if the 
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needs, deserve or message resonance components influence the dependent variable and to 
what degree. The design for the case is outlined below. 
The first section of this case study will outline the data and sources. The 
characteristics of each dataset will be discussed and elaborated upon. Next, I will provide 
a background on the sample set. The third section will focus on analysis and 
establishment of the dependent variable through a general comparative analysis and then 
through a spatio-temporal analysis. This analysis will provide for the establishment of 
three variations of the dependent variable with which to compare the independent 
variables. The fourth and fifth sections are the analysis of the first and second 
independent variables. Finally, the last section will present the overall findings from 
comparison among the variables and provide context for the drawing of prescriptive 
implications. 
C. DATA AND SOURCES 
Six major datasets were used for this thesis. All the data were first stripped of any 
classified information and then formatted for the model. The remainder of this section 
will outline the specifics of each major dataset. 
1. DV Datasets 
The first dataset is the CERP reconstruction dataset. This data was obtained 
through the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) and spans from February 
2004 to October 2009. The characteristics of this data include the location of the project, 
an explanation of the project, the amount of money spent, and the proposed and actual 
start and finish dates. Note that there are both reconstruction and non-reconstruction uses 
of CERP. This thesis uses only those projects that were characterized as reconstruction by 
the IRMS.  
The second major dataset was the violence data. This dataset is based on 
Significant Action (SIGACT) data derived from the U.S. Army Topographic Engineer 
Center (now called the U.S. Army Geospatial Center), where they were stripped of any 
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classified information. This dataset spans from February 4, 2004—September 13, 2009 
and includes date-time group (DTG), grid coordinate of incident, and description of 
incident. There are a few notable weaknesses for the SIGACT data. First, collection on 
the details of violent acts has improved over time. The SIGACT reports in 2004 and 2005 
were not nearly as detailed as they are today. Additionally, reporting on what classifies as 
a SIGACT has changed through the course of the war and the coding remains 
inconsistent across areas of operation. Finally, there is an inconsistent recording of the 
intended target of the attacks. Initially, SIGACT data only included those violent acts that 
were taken against U.S. forces. More current SIGACT data is typically filtered through 
regional Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs) where personnel from Iraqi and U.S. forces 
are present. Thus, the reporting is more substantial and events not involving U.S. forces 
are more regularly captured.  
2. IV1 Datasets 
The third major dataset is that used to determine the penetration of “bad guys” 
(BAC) into a village or neighborhood. This data consists of three separate categories 
weighted from most important to least important: the current U.S. brigade top 15 High 
Value Individuals (HVIs), the emerging threats, which consist of those individuals that 
are not on the HVI list yet, but pose a threat to the stability of the region, and finally the 
Iraqi Army HVIs.101 All redundancy was removed from this data along with classified 
information so all that remained was a count of “bad guys” per location.  
The fourth major dataset is tips and reporting for the TAC component of IV1. This 
dataset is a record of the number of tips given to counterinsurgents by Iraqi citizens by 
location. This dataset also has notable weaknesses. First, it is doubtful that the data are 
comprehensive given the comparatively low numbers. Second, there is no DTG with the 
data so it is impossible to determine the period covered. Third, the data do not include 
HUMan INTelligence (HUMINT) reports, which are a very valuable and abundant source 
                                                 
101 This data was obtained from 2/1 CAV, the U.S. Army brigade currently responsible for the 
security of the At Tameem province.  
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of reporting. Nonetheless, the dataset does show the willingness of a particular village or 
neighborhood to share information with counterinsurgents.  
The fifth dataset is the village assessments. In 2006, I initiated administration of 
the village assessments in the Kirkuk province through the Iraqi Army. As seen in 
Appendix A, these assessments capture a status on population size, number of houses, 
essential services and they also provide a survey of local opinions on the capabilities of 
the government, criminal justice system and security forces. These assessments were 
completed by soldiers of the Iraqi Army who were trained in collection methods and in 
some cases resided in the villages they assessed. The soldiers were trained to assess the 
essential services themselves and to interview at least three people in each village—one 
village elder, one village leader—preferably the chosen village leader or Mukhtar, and 
one average villager. For this analysis, the village assessments were first translated from 
Arabic to English and then coded from a green, amber, red, black status to a numerical 
status of 1-4, with (1) being the best (green) and (4) being the worst/non-existent (black). 
This dataset consists of 168 villages or neighborhoods throughout the At Tameem 
province. The village specific data are quite accurate as the village mukhtars know 
exactly how many people and houses are under their responsibility and the status of 
services. However, there is certainly some bias with regard to the perception of the 
villagers toward the governmental institutions. Although the villagers were interviewed 
by Iraqis (thereby eliminating some forms of bias), there still exists hesitancy by some to 
be truly forthcoming with regard to their views—as is the case with most surveys.  
3. IV2 Datasets 
The final dataset used for IV2 is the media dataset. These data provide the type, 
name, location and footprint of media outlets in the At Tameem province. The types of 
available outlets are newspaper, television and radio. There are a total of 35 media outlets 




There are a total of 695 villages or neighborhoods in the At Tameem province and 
the sample assessed is 168 out of the 695 total. All the data could not be ascribed to these 
168 villages; thus, I had to determine a distance to which a village would retain 
attribution. This section will describe how samples were chosen for analysis.  
I first looked to the study of the “journey to crime,” to determine how far to 
assign attribution. Understandably, this process is extremely complicated and context 
dependent. There has been a concentrated amount of research conducted in the U.S. and 
the U.K. analyzing the distance criminals travel to conduct their crimes.102 The distance 
depends on a number of factors, including: average number of vehicles per household, 
density of road networks, types of crime, presence of law enforcement, etc. Additionally, 
actual data is needed both on the crime committed and the distance traveled by the 
criminal to commit the crime to calculate predictive distances traveled. Such data is not 
available for Kirkuk at this time. Thus, in determining where to assign attribution with 
regard to the 168 assessed villages I plausibly set the max distance to five kilometers. In 
other words, because I did not have access to journey to crime data to calibrate my 
model, I could not assign responsibility to crimes committed at further distances. Out of 
the 9018 SIGACTs committed in the At Tameem province since February 2004, 457 of 
them occurred at distances greater than five kilometers from the villages which were 
assessed. This accounts for approximately 5%. Figure 5.2 highlights those SIGACTs 
which were excluded from this research. The black dots represent the assessed villages, 
the red dots are SIGACTs and the blue dots are those SIGACTs that were excluded. The 
same five kilometers distance was used for the attribution of all DV and IV1 datasets.  
                                                 
102 CrimeStat by Ned Levine and Associates and the National Institute of Justice serves as a valuable 
tool in this regard and the CrimeStat III user manual outlines the history of journey to crime analysis. 




Figure 5.2. SIGACTs Greater than five kilometers from Assessed Villages 
E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
In the establishment of my dependent variable, I assessed the historical 
relationship between CERP spending and violence at the village level to identify what 
constituted successful implementation of CERP in the At Tameem province. I first 
conducted a basic comparative analysis of CERP spending and violence for all 695 At 
Tameem villages by attributing CERP money spent and violent acts to the nearest village. 
Next, I used ArcGIS to assign attribution of the two components based on the five 
kilometer sampling methodology mentioned previously. Thus, each of the 168 assessed 
villages were given the attributes of the CERP money spent and violent acts that occurred 
within five kilometers of the village center. I utilized two approaches to analyze the 





this section will first give an overview of the comparative statistics between CERP and 
violence for all 695 villages and then present the comparative and spatio-temporal 
analysis of the 168 sampled villages. 
1. General Analysis of All 695 At Tameem Villages 
For the general analysis of all 695 villages, I examined the correlation between 
CERP money spent and violent acts, the regression of the two components and the 
descriptive statistics. The remainder of this section will explain the components of each 
examination and the results.  
Correlative analysis for violent acts and CERP money spent by village for all At 
Tameem villages reveals a value of (+) 0.302. This weak positive relationship shows that 
at the village level of analysis, the more CERP money that is spent, the more violent acts 
occur. The regression output depicts the same relationship and the scatter-plot in Figure 
5.3 provides a visual representation of the data.103 
 
Figure 5.3. Scatter-plot of Violent Acts per CERP $ Spent in At Tameem 
                                                 
103 Full regression output can be seen in Appendix B, Section II—DV Figures. 
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Out of 695 total villages in At Tameem, 152 were recipients of both violent acts 
and CERP projects. The sum of violent acts from February 2004 to September 2009 for 
these 152 villages was 6106 and an average of $74,102 was spent per village. There were 
293 villages where no CERP reconstruction money was spent that accounted for 25.13% 
of total violence over the same time period. Finally, 91 CERP reconstruction projects 
were built in 43 villages where there was not a single violent act over the 5 year period. 
The total spent in these villages amounts to $15.3 million or 9.77% of total provincial 
spending.  
2. Comparative Analysis of 168 Sampled Villages 
For the sampled comparative analysis, I again examined the correlation between 
CERP reconstruction expenditures and violence, the regression of the two components 
and the basic descriptive statistics of the two components. The remainder of this section 
will explain the components of each examination and the results. 
For the sampled villages, the correlative analysis reveals a slightly lower value of 
(+) 0.201. This value does however; still represent a weak positive relationship between 
the spending of CERP reconstruction money and violent acts. The scatter-plot in Figure 
5.4 demonstrates the visual relationship between the components. 
 
Figure 5.4. Violent Acts per $ CERP for 168 Sampled Villages 
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Of the 168 sampled villages, 102 were recipients of both violent acts and CERP 
reconstruction. The sum of violent acts from February 2004 to September 2009 for these 
102 villages was 7456 (out of 9030 for the entire province) and an average of $784,673 
was spent per village. There were 64 villages where no CERP money was spent that 
accounted for 13.93% of total violence in the sample villages. Finally, only 13 projects 
amounting to $1.44 million were built in two villages where no violent acts occurred.  
3. Spatio-Temporal Analysis of 168 Assessed Villages 
The purpose of the spatio-temporal analysis was to first identify when violent acts 
occurred in relation to when CERP reconstruction was planned and second to identify 
where violent acts occurred in relation to where CERP projects were constructed. Figure 
5.5 depicts histograms of violent acts and CERP projects by day from February 2004 to 
September 2009 for the At Tameem province.  
 
Figure 5.5. # SIGACTs vs. # CERP Reconstruction Projects by Day in At Tameem 
As shown in the histograms, there is not much of a temporal relationship between 
violence and CERP expenditures. The results suggest that historically CERP was not 
utilized as a tool against violence. CERP projects do not seem to be in response to 
violence and violence does not appear to be influenced by CERP projects. A spatio-
temporal analysis will add a geographic component for analysis. 
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ArcGIS provides an extremely useful tool for spatio-temporal analysis. With time 
series data, the program allows you to play events as they occur regardless of event type. 
This analysis again looked at the occurrence of violence in relation to the planning of 
CERP projects. The date used for the CERP projects is the forecasted award date, as 
opposed to the project start or completion date. Figure 5.6 provides an example of the 
spatio-temporal analysis in ArcGIS and a full set of the screen shots exist in Appendix B, 
Section XI. The red dots represent violent acts and the green dots represent planned 
CERP projects.  
 
Figure 5.6. Histogram of SIGACTs and CERP projects from 2004 to 2007  
in At Tameem 
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When these events are viewed in a movie format, it is clear that there is little 
correlation between where violent acts occur and where reconstruction projects are 
planned. This shows that counterinsurgents were not attempting to leverage popular 
support in areas where insurgent violence was prevalent through the provision of 
essential services or other CERP related projects. On the contrary, the data show that 
CERP projects were predominately planned in those areas where violence was low or 
non-existent. The spatio-temporal analysis provides a valuable distinction from the basic 
comparative analysis. According to the comparative analysis, it appears that the violent 
acts per dollars spent were more proportional. But the comparative analysis represents 
cumulative data from the entire five year period. From February 2004 to September 2009, 
CERP expenditures in the At Tameem province were not utilized as a weapon system in 
areas with high insurgent influence. The comparative analysis demonstrates such and the 
spatio-temporal analysis compounds this fact. There is some proof, however, that the 
expenditures worked as a weapon system. The next section will try to encapsulate the 
degree to which the expenditures worked to allow for follow on comparison with the 
independent variables.  
4. Establishment of the DVs: CERP Money to Violence Ratios 
In order to determine the contribution of the independent variables toward 
successful CERP implementation at the village level, a DV figure for comparison must be 
established to depict the relative success of CERP implementation in each village. Given 
the analysis above, a CERP to violence ratio was developed and is represented below. 
 
DV1 represents the simple ratio between money spent and violence at the village 
level. DV2 represents the same ratio with locally normalized violence. This DV 
represents the ratio between CERP money spent and violence, but is locally normalized 
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by sub-district violence and population size.104 A higher output in each of these three 
DVs represents a more successful CERP to violence ratio. In other words, $10 spent per 
10 violent acts is worse than $10 spent per five violent acts. These ratios represent the 
success of CERP implementation. We will now establish the IVs and analyze the 
relationship between the IVs and the DVs.  
F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
To determine the degree to which each of the IVs influences the DV, I had to 
format each of the IVs in through the process mentioned in Chapters III and IV. Next, I 
input all data into a large village level database for comparison. This section will discuss 
how the IV data were input into the model and then elaborate on the details of 
comparison.  
1. IV1: Project Characteristics 
In congruence with Chapter III, each of the values for all the needs and deserve 
components were first derived for all 168 villages. The village assessments provided all 
the values for the needs and the attitude values for the deserve component. The action 
values for the deserve component were obtained through the assistance of the coalition 
force brigade currently over watching the At Tameem province. Following the 
normalization of the values as described in Chapter III, I pulled from the dataset the 
sample component in the same manner as with the DV. Those events that occurred within 
five kilometers of a sampled village were assigned to the nearest village and those further 
than five kilometers from a sampled village were discarded. This section will elaborate 
on the steps taken to build the needs and deserve components for the model.  
Upon the receipt of the village assessments from Iraq, they were translated and 
coded as mentioned in section C. The perceived weights of importance were then 
                                                 
104 Two other variations of this DV were developed. The first was simply the ration between money 
spend and violence and the second was the same ration normalized by localized violence. When the model 
was run against these DVs, the results were weak likely because they were not appropriately constructed. 
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multiplied by the assessed status for each village to obtain a final needs value for each 
village. A screenshot of this database can be seen in Appendix B, Section VI. 
Next, I built the deserve model which was significantly more complex. The data 
were all assigned five kilometer attribution and then imported and normalized as per 
Chapter III. Appendix B, Section VII provides a screenshot of these variables. The output 
value from the deserve variable determines where each village falls on the spectrum of 
popular support.  
I assessed three versions of the IV1 model: N+D, N*D, and N+D + (N*D), where 
N= Needs and D = Deserve. Upon the analysis of the final output, in which a higher 
number represented higher priority for a village, it was the N*D relationship that 
intuitively placed the villages in the order similar to that which I hypothesized. 
Determination of the utility of this final output value, however, will have to wait until the 
model can be field tested. The results of IV1 alone were interesting, but IV2 adds a 
valuable component for analysis. 
2. IV2: Message Resonance 
Determination of the extent to which the message accompanying a CERP 
reconstruction project will resonate is clearly context dependent. For this research, I 
analyzed this phenomenon from the micro, meso and macro levels. These three levels 
with regard to CERP reconstruction can best be thought of according to the following 
classification: 
Micro—Will they see it? 
Meso—Will they talk about it? Maybe they don’t see it but their neighbors do. 
Macro—Will they hear about it, read about it, or watch it? 
The remainder of this section will explain how numerical values for each of these 




To determine the extent to which the people of a village will see a project, I used 
the population densities of each village. As discussed in Chapter IV, much like the spread 
of infectious disease, the denser a population, the more likely a message is to spread. 
ArcGIS again was used for this analysis. I first created a population density for each 
assessed village using standard deviation as the classification and using 1 standard 
deviation as the interval size. Subsequently, to generate an output value for each village 
to input into the model, I used the zonal statistics function in the ArcGIS spatial analyst 
toolbox to create an output value for each village. Through this process I was able to pull 
the numerical density value for each specific village (or geographical point) in tabular 
format. Those villages with higher population densities have a higher output value. A 
graph depicting the output is shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7. Population Density Values by Village 
The mean values for each village were then input into the model under the micro 




For the meso level analysis, I examined the proximity of each village to every 
other village to determine the likelihood that residents of one village would talk about 
CERP reconstruction projects in another village. As per Chapter IV, it is more likely that 
tightly clustered villages will have a higher exposure to the goings on of a nearby village 
or adjoining neighborhood than of a distant village. Hawth’s tools in ArcGIS was used to 
determine the density of villages throughout the province. I then used zonal statistics 
function of the spatial analyst toolbox to determine point values for each of the village 
densities. The outputs were achieved in the same format as those at the micro level and 
can be seen in Appendix B, Section IX.  
The macro level was slightly more complicated. I obtained a media dataset from 
the same coalition force unit responsible for the At Tameem province. There are a total of 
35 media outlets in the realms of newspaper, television and radio.  For the television and 
radio data, I used ArcGIS to create buffers. The results can be seen in Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.8. Television and Radio Outlets in At Tameem Province 
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For the various newspapers, I had to use the distribution numbers to determine 
which villages had access based on population size. Out of the 19 newspapers available 
in the province, I set allocation to population sizes of 5,000; 10,000 and 15,000 for local, 
regional and national papers respectively. I determined these numbers based on the 
footprint and distribution numbers for each newspaper in my dataset.  
To assemble the results of the media data, each media outlet was given a value of 
one. If the media outlet was available to the village, the village received a score of one 
for that outlet. If not, the village received a zero. A sum score was then derived for each 
village. Villages with a higher score have greater access to media.  
Next, I normalized the outputs from the micro, meso and macro levels in the same 
manner described in Chapters III and IV. The normalized values were subsequently 
summed for a final IV2 output. A snapshot of the final output can be seen in Appendix B, 
Section XI. The next section will present the major findings from the results of the needs, 
deserve and message resonance values for each village.  
G. KEY FINDINGS 
Once the output values for needs, deserve, and message resonance were 
determined, analysis to examine the extent to which each of these variables influenced 
the dependent variable was conducted using multivariate regression. Analysis of those 
cases where CERP was most successful revealed a major theme: there is a noticeable 
pattern in terms of which variables more heavily influence the dependent variable—
deserve and message resonance.  
While the statistics are not overwhelmingly robust due to the fact that CERP 
hasn’t been implemented in the fashion this model dictates, in those cases where CERP 
implementation was more successful, the deserve and message resonance variables 
played a considerably more important role. Comparison between the IVs and DV3, which 
is normalized by localized violence and population, provides the most considerable 
revelation—with village needs being notably less important to the influence of violence. 
The size of the coefficient in relation to the range of the dependent variable demonstrates 
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that the results are substantively significant. Additionally, the Tstat values for the deserve 
and message resonance variables show that the results are both substantively significant 
and somewhat statistically significant.105 A snapshot of the complete regression output 
can be found in Appendix C, Section I. 
Analysis of the output of the mathematical interaction between these variables 
reveals a prioritization list that is noticeably weighted more heavily by the deserve and 
message resonance components. For example, almost every neighborhood in Kirkuk city 
is at the top of the list. This is consistent with the ability of a message to resonate to a 
much higher degree in these areas. Additionally, behaviorally these same areas occupy 
the middle ground—the probability that they can be swayed to support counterinsurgents 
is higher. A look at the village of Haweeja follows in kind. Haweeja is in the top 10% of 
the prioritization list and exhibits the same deserve and message resonance characteristics 
as the Kirkuk neighborhoods. A snapshot of the final model output can be found in 
Appendix C, Section II. 
The patterns revealed through analysis of the At Tameem are of sizeable 
significance. If CERP truly is to be used as a “weapon system,” these patterns depict 
those variables that should receive more weight or consideration with regard to CERP 
money allocation. This is consistent with the fact that many argue reconstruction is of 
marginal influence at best because reconstruction has been almost exclusively 
implemented according to the assessed needs of a region alone. These findings prove 
useful and will substantiate several lucrative implications and future recommendations. 
                                                 
105 Tstat values were 1.31 and 1.74 for the deserve and message resonance variables, respectively.  
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is clear that several dynamic factors influence the nature of conflict. Popular 
support in any type of conflict is always something national and international forces will 
have to grapple with. In a type of conflict where the enemy is vying for the exact same 
support base, the environment becomes significantly more complex. The ability to 
capture and kill threats to national and international norms is an important component for 
the provision of security, but this component alone rarely if ever prevents further 
violence—especially when considering a budding insurgency. Security and 
reconstruction are not independent, rather they are interdependent. This has become a 
resounding reality in Iraq and Afghanistan. The extent to which reconstruction can be 
used to influence the security situation is extremely valuable to the optimization of the 
security environment and money spent on reconstruction. This thesis is an effort to 
understand how and to what extent reconstruction can influence the security environment. 
There were two fundamental purposes of this research. First, to determine if 
CERP has historically influenced the security environment in any measureable way and 
second, to develop a model comprised of those components that could plausibly be 
argued to have an effect on violence and determine which components most significantly 
influence insurgency. The model was developed in congruence with Social Movement 
Theory, encompassing those components that would most significantly contribute to the 
diffusion of contentious collective action.  
The framework presented through this model generates a number of testable 
implications on the relationship between CERP reconstruction and violence. The model 
was tested using village level data from the At Tameem province in Iraq. The remainder 
of this chapter will summarize the results and present subsequent implications and 
recommendations. Section A will summarize the restated findings of the final analysis. 
Section B will unpack the implications derived from the findings. Section C will present 
recommendations. Section D will discuss options for further research, and section E will 
conclude with final remarks. 
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A. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The restated findings of the analysis show that first, historically in the At Tameem 
province, CERP reconstruction has had no influence (negative influence) on violence. On 
the contrary, the statistics show that there is a weak positive relationship between CERP 
money and violence for both the entire province and the sample set. However, spatio-
temporal analysis of CERP spending and violence in the At Tameem province, revealed it 
was not the intention of commanders to spend CERP in an effort to influence violence.  
Upon analysis of those variables presented in the prioritization model and their 
relation to the dependent variable, it became clear that the deserve and message 
resonance components will most significantly influence violence. Using those cases 
where CERP was allocated most successfully (i.e., it had the most negative influence on 
violence), it was derived that the needs of a village are not as important as the deserve 
and message resonance components in influencing violence.  
The mathematical relationships between these variables also produce an output 
that logically validates these findings. Those villages or neighborhoods that were more 
deserving and spatially located in areas where the accompanying message could resonate 
to a higher degree were higher on the prioritization list. The implications that follow were 
deduced from these findings.  
B. IMPLICATIONS 
There are several prescriptive implications that can be deduced from this research. 
This section will proceed from the micro to macro levels with variable implications, 
security implications, financial implications, implications on the utility of this model in 
other conflicts, and implications for broader reconstruction funds. Each will yield 
imperative considerations for final recommendations. 
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1. Variable Implications  
Valuable implications can be derived from each of the three independent variables 
with regard to how they influenced the dependent variable. They are outlined as follows. 
While the needs variable proved less important to the influence of violence, 
consideration of this variable is still extremely important and its contribution will vary by 
location. In areas with an overall greater state of need, the contribution of the needs 
variable could be significantly more profound. Additionally, manipulation of the deserve 
variable by the addition, subtraction or reinforcement of indicators could reveal greater 
importance of the needs variable. Finally, in remote areas where the media is as sparse as 
the people, the needs variable would likely influence violence to a higher degree.  
The deserve variable is only as robust as the individual who characterizes it. A 
commander who is in tune with his environment and takes into account all factors that 
indicate the willingness of a population to support counterinsurgent efforts will likely 
achieve more desirable effects. As it was modeled in this research it clearly played a 
heavy role, but more information could allow it to play a more or possibly less substantial 
role. Determining where a population’s support lies is more of a science than a gut 
feeling. What people say and what they do are quite often two different things in areas 
where lives are in danger. For this reason, careful and documented consideration must be 
given to this variable. At the time of this research, I was unable to find any indication that 
reconstruction has been implemented with this variable as a contributing factor in project 
prioritization. This point will be expounded upon in the recommendations section. 
Message resonance is a phrase that be characterized by most commanders as 
“soft” at best. However, this research has shown that is actually more important in 
influencing violence than satisfying the needs of the people. Like the deserve variable, 
message resonance accompanying project completion has rarely if ever been a 
consideration of CERP project planners. It can be deduced that in more remote areas, 
message resonance may play a much less substantial role. Additionally, knowledge of 
literacy rates would further contribute to understanding the degree to which newspapers 
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or other text media outlets would contribute to overall resonance. Regardless of location, 
people communicate ideas and concerns. The level to which counterinsurgents can tap 
into the communication network will determine the level to which the ancillary effects of 
reconstruction projects will resonate and the level to which violence will be influenced. 
Each of the independent variables influenced the dependent variable 
demonstrating that they all play a role in the influence of violence. Modifications of these 
variables to fit various environmental nuances will likely reveal even more promising 
results. The degree to which commanders operationalize the variables to take into 
account all factors involved will determine the level of CERP spending success.  
2. Security Implications 
The key implication with regard to security, as demonstrated through analysis of 
the At Tameem province, is that CERP reconstruction can influence violence. Some, such 
as General Chiarelli, have noticed the ancillary effects of reconstruction efforts, but funds 
have not been allocated in such a manner that would maximize these ancillary benefits. It 
is likely that the other provinces in Iraq and Afghanistan embody the same trend with 
regard to the desire by commanders to use money to influence the security environment.  
The model used to determine if the needs, deserve, and message resonance 
variables influenced violence and to what extent can easily be manipulated to capture the 
context of other specific areas of operations. The contribution of other potential 
contributors to the determination of which villages should receive CERP money can be 
manipulated as a commander sees fit. This predominately applies to the deserve variable. 
For example, the input for the tips variable (TAC) should be filtered based on the 
usefulness and validity of information received. Ultimately, the plethora of data available 
in a classified setting in this regard will present more detailed and refined results.  
Knowledge of the operational environment is critical for successful CERP 
implementation. In the same manner that intelligence sections collect and interpret 
information on security threats, those responsible for CERP implementation must collect 
and interpret information that can be used to maximize the effects of CERP expenditures 
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(part of which is intelligence on security threats). Commanders are likely to be the most 
in tune with their areas of operations, and should thus be the first line of defense for poor 
spending. Higher knowledge of the operational environment leads to greater effects. This 
leads to the importance of the next point. 
The deserve component was designed in the model with the ability to weight each 
factor differently than others. These weights can be adjusted to allow a command team to 
calibrate the output in a manner that appears plausible. The degree to which 
counterinsurgents become familiar with their environment will determine the degree to 
which they can incorporate sensitive factors and subsequently, the degree to which CERP 
implementation will have the potential to influence violence. Contrarily, lack of such 
knowledge could actually worsen the security environment. Examples of this are 
represented in the case study of the At Tameem province. With the complexities involved 
in insurgencies, counterinsurgents cannot afford the burden of creating even more 
opposition. 
3. Financial Implications 
With the ability of security implications to influence life or death, implications 
with regard to money spent seem somewhat less ostentatious. They are however, 
important to consider and ring a little louder during difficult economic times. Three 
general types of CERP spending (besides effective spending) are present currently: poor 
spending, wasted spending and harmful spending.  
Poor spending is resident in those areas where CERP reconstruction minimally 
contributed to violence. This is likely a result of a commander’s poor understanding of 
the operational environment. It would be understandable to exercise poor spending in the 
early stages of deployment; however a continual trend in this direction prevents an 
effective return on any one investment. Spending concentrated on those areas that are 
predicted to provide substantial returns should receive greater focus. 
Wasted spending is that which is wasted on areas where the incentive value is not 
being used. As mentioned previously, there are numerous funds that can be used for 
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support maintenance. If CERP truly is to be used as a weapon system, it cannot be wasted 
on areas where there has not been a single violent act. In the At Tameem province, this 
research found that $15.4 million or 10% of total CERP spending in Kirkuk was spent in 
areas where there has been zero violence. Similarly, 25% of the total violence in the 
province has occurred in villages that have not received a single dollar of CERP money.  
Harmful spending is that which actually contributes to violence. Broad analysis of 
the entire province shows a weak positive correlation between CERP spending and 
violence. In early 2007, I participated in a mission to provide basic services to a few 
refugees that had turned the Kirkuk soccer stadium into a deprived apartment complex. 
Conditions were the worst of any in the city. We provided assistance to those families we 
deemed most in need and brought along provincial government officials to participate. 
The results were incredibly negative. We essentially started a riot and could have caused 
harm not only to ourselves, but to those to whom we provided aid. Everyone who did not 
receive these basic services was outraged. Careful consideration must be given to every 
single expenditure, to ensure that such results are avoided. Spending can actually hurt 
progress and, with every dollar spent, the ability to influence popular support in the future 
is lessened.  
The final implication with regard to spending is consideration of international and 
indigenous reconstruction agencies. Poor practices and quality may provide short-term 
relief but could create long-term problems, even violence. As every project is completed, 
it obviously has to be turned over to the people and local institutions to maintain. If the 
project doesn’t contribute to the collective greater good, than it is likely a poor project for 
consideration. Additionally, if the shelf life of the project is more temporary than long 
term, other agencies are going to have to sink even more money into project maintenance 
or new construction. Association with campaign plans and overarching goals will likely 
prevent such occurrences.  
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4. Implications on the Utility of This Research in Other Conflicts 
While the characteristics of the Iraq conflict and those of the At Tameem province 
in particular, are quite different from the characteristics of other conflicts around the 
world, it can be deduced that in any type of conflict where popular support is a 
contributing factor to resolution, application of reconstruction according to this model 
will yield similar results. As has been alluded to throughout this research, a commander’s 
understanding of the operational environment directly determines the success of 
implementation. This model can easily accommodate any operational concerns that are 
unique to a particular area. At the onset of conflict when understanding of the 
environment is more adolescent, it would likely prove useful to query local allies to 
determine on which points pressure should be placed. Unfortunately, little can be done if 
the status and beliefs of people at the village level are not known. This has become 
apparent in the history of Afghanistan. Rarely has the central government been able to 
adequately provide for the remote and distant areas of the country. Regional warlords 
have been empowered primarily because of their localized knowledge and influence.  
The model presented in this research can be applied to other conflicts; however, 
the speed and accuracy of assessing the status and beliefs of people will gauge success. 
For this reason, the most valuable implication may be that prioritization according to this 
model should be entrusted to those who know the people best—indigenous institutions. It 
is difficult for an occupying force to ever understand what makes the people of a different 
country tick, especially a different country with a different religion and ethnicity. The 
difficulty in empowering indigenous institutions with the prioritization and spending of 
large sums of money is trust. Such a scenario presents an opportunity for corruption and 
unanticipated influence. Therefore, indigenous personnel should only be incorporated to 
the degree which they can be trusted to spend according to established norms. Lack of 
consideration of the potential for corruption can lead to degenerative effects and a cycle 
of mistrust that could push a population’s support over to the insurgents.   
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5. Implications for Broader Reconstruction Funds 
This research analyzed the spending of CERP as it contributes to insurgency. 
However, consideration of dynamics the current conflicts reveals that complete security 
is an unlikely option before reconstruction efforts must be undertaken. This has become 
more apparent as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have progressed. Security and 
reconstruction efforts must be undertaken concurrently due to their interdependent 
relationship. As the planning for higher level projects using other reconstruction funds is 
carried out, it would be wise for those responsible to consider the impact their 
reconstruction efforts will have on the security environment and prioritize their projects 
accordingly. Not that all reconstruction funds are to be used as “weapon systems,” but 
lack of consideration in this regard would run contrary to the reason these projects are 
built in the first place—to help people in low-intensity and post-conflict countries return 
to a state of normalcy.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considering the ability of CERP to influence violence, there are several key 
recommendations. They concern guidance for CERP use, knowledge of the operational 
environment, and future considerations for use. 
1. Policy for the Use of CERP 
The purpose of CERP use needs to be updated, clearly defined, distributed and 
supported. Written guidance outlining the explicit purpose of the CERP is exactly the 
same as it was in 2003—it is weak, and consists mostly of a list of what one can and 
cannot buy. Once the purpose is formally defined, the guidance needs to be distributed to 
the widest extent possible. There is considerable confusion as to what the purpose of 
CERP is and what it should be. The openness of the system, which enables commanders 
to spend as they feel necessary, may actually be too liberal, as many feared. Utilization of 
CERP should be focused first and foremost on gaining popular support. If the intended 
purpose is not as a weapon system, the fund should be removed from consideration for 
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appropriation because, as this research has shown, expenditure does influence violence. 
Lack of a clear purpose, guidance, and oversight will lead to more than just the 
inappropriate expenditure of government money—which is where current precautions are 
focused and what a large portion of the standard operating procedure addresses. Neglect 
could also cause inappropriate use to contribute to violence.  
2. Area of Operations Expertise 
As has become apparent throughout this research, the extent to which a 
commander understands the area of operations will significantly contribute to operational 
success. This fact is echoed in the literature. The numerous stresses of the combat 
environment make it difficult for a commander to spend time meeting people and 
assessing the environment. Further, rewards often focus less on relationships developed 
than on more tangible, hard results. Command guidance must mandate fluency in the 
operational environment and this should be the top priority. Assessment of the current 
situation enables a commander to better conduct all types of operations. Periodic 
assessments of essential service statuses and popular belief should occur without fail at 
least a few times during a commander’s deployment. The following sub-section outlines 
the recommendations on the importance and tactics for assessments. 
a. Village Assessments 
Although many sources, such as the RAND Guidebook for Supporting 
Economic Development in Stability Operations, elaborate on the need to conduct 
assessments, they offer little in terms of a format on how to do so.106 There are many 
characteristics of an assessment that are necessary to ensure the most accurate deductions 
can be drawn.  
First, the assessment must be completed by personnel who understand the 
customs and culture of the environment. This may not immediately appear as necessary, 
                                                 
106 RAND, Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2009), 59. 
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but culture is a substantial component of the assessment process. An assessor from a 
Western international entity will be inherently inclined to assess a status compared to that 
with which he is accustomed. For example, lack of a visible centralized water system 
may convince an assessor to record a status as non-existent. However, upon dialogue 
with the village constituents, or an understanding of decentralized tribal culture, the 
assessor would realize that constituents have absolutely no shortage of water because of 
the nearby river where they’ve harvested their water for the past 1,000 years. With the 
lack of a basic understanding of the customs and culture, assessors run the risk of 
recording inaccurate results, which could observably lead to a skewed understanding 
from which a commander makes a decision. 
Second, the assessor should be an individual who is trusted to assess a 
status objectively. If an international actor is making the assessment, the individual 
should be someone mature enough to make an unmotivated decision. Careful 
consideration should be taken when employing an individual from indigenous security 
forces, as the individual may be inclined to make a decision based on some sort of ethnic, 
familial or religious affiliation. Precautions must be taken to ensure the assessment is as 
unbiased as possible. 
Third, when engaging the populace, the interviewees should be plural and 
balanced in stature. The opinions of a regional power broker could be much different than 
those of a low-income housewife. A balanced approach will result in the identification of 
the overall average and, therefore, most accurate assessment. 
Fourth, the assessment must include the right questions. While statuses on 
the basic essential Sewer, Water, Electricity, Academics, and Trash (SWEAT) services 
should be recorded, the opinions of the people on various other topics could be extremely 
valuable. The questions should be derived from the commander’s intent, wherein the 
results ultimately better enable the commander to make informed decisions with regard to 




Fifth, assessments are living documents. Resources should be dedicated 
toward continually updating the records. Only with the most accurate and up-to-date 
information can a commander make a decision that will have an expected impact. Too 
often, security force personnel fall in on previously completed assessments and consider 
the task complete. An updated assessment, and its considered relativity to other regional 
assessments, is critical to a commander’s understanding of the area of operations.  
Finally, the results of the assessments should be shared and discussed. 
Dissemination and discussion of the assessments facilitates a common understanding and 
helps flush out potential shortfalls or requirements for more information. Interagency 
consideration is important to ensure widespread background and expertise is applied to 
the problem. It is common for problems addressed by just the security component, for 
example, to be looked at from an exclusively security perspective. The most effective 
assessments will have buy in and input from all agencies that could possibly be 
concerned. 
These stated characteristics for a good assessment are not all inclusive; 
however, they are all necessary and some of the most important for the generation of 
accurate and reliable results. Deficiency in any category mentioned above will result in 
the recording of statuses that may not be ground truth depictions and, therefore, derived 
implications could be ineffective or potentially detrimental to the security environment. 
An additional consideration for the conduct of assessments is the 
employment of the indigenous population. While there is risk of bias inherent in 
employing indigenous personnel to report on the status of services for the people they 
know and love, carefully evaluated employment can often engender rewarding and 
truthful results. Other than the value in actually generating income for the indigenous 
assessors, the most lucrative benefits come from greater understanding through 
perspective. As already discussed, cultural perspective is valuable for the achievement of 
accurate ground truth statuses, but it is also pays dividends through the psychological 
intuition of an indigenous population group. Critical to the understanding of what a 
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population needs is not just the assessment of what they need, but also an understanding 
of how a particular people value what they need. 
An essential portion of the village assessment is that which is designed to 
collect opinions on that information a commander determines as necessary for 
influencing the security environment. It is difficult for a foreign entity to achieve an 
accurate estimate due to their inherent detachment from the local population. Thus, it is 
extremely beneficial for the purpose of accurately measuring this variable to employ 
indigenous personnel in the collection of this data. Locals of the same entity will display 
less hesitancy in verbalizing their opinions to one of their own, than they will in 
discussing the situation with a foreigner. 
b. Area of Operations Expertise Summary 
Collaboration with indigenous forces should be a requirement. While the 
opinions of indigenous force personnel may not always be trusted, the potential 
perspective a valuable ally could provide cannot be overlooked. There are smart and 
knowledgeable indigenous force personnel who can provide invaluable perspective if 
tapped into.  
It is the responsibility of a commander to understand an area of operations, 
but it is also the responsibility of the larger apparatus to enable a commander to do so. 
There are several factors that can facilitate a more gradual learning curve. Consideration 
should be given to deploying units to the same locations on successive deployments, 
keeping personnel in the same units for longer periods of time, longer deployments and 
reach back programs. The U.S. Army has given consideration to each of these 
possibilities and each has clear pros and cons. The recently initiated Afghan Hands 
program serves as a positive step in this regard. The Afghan Hands personnel will serve 
in the same area for five years. When not deployed, they will stay current on the daily 
activities through video telephone conferences and other methods with their forward 




The current conflicts require soldiers to be better diplomats than 
marksmen. Marketing, interpersonal skills and language skills are vitally important to 
success—especially at higher levels and for those individuals who engage the local 
population. Pre-deployment training, however, focuses almost exclusively on shooting, 
moving and communicating. The complexities of the modern battlefield require more.  
3. Data Collection and Maintenance 
The ability to assess current operational success is fundamentally dependent on 
data. The conceptual firestorm that accompanies most deployments often forces 
commanders to leave data collection and analysis to the intelligence staff. It is nearly 
impossible to gauge current operational success without the presence of data for 
comparison. Data should again be collected according to those indicators a commander 
feels will contribute to higher command guidance goals. Further, data should be shared 
with incoming units to allow for analysis and understanding of the operational 
environment. The only data that are shared across the board presently are violence data. 
Higher emphasis needs to be placed on all those factors that can influence stability. 
4. Future Considerations for the CERP Program 
As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and a timetable is placed on Afghanistan, the 
availability of CERP after participation concludes in these conflicts becomes a concern. 
While CERP has influenced violence in these conflicts, it is not beyond belief that this 
tool will be forgotten upon conclusion. Care must be taken to ensure that these funds 
remain available in all military operations and maintenance (OMA) accounts. Value has 
been realized and the inability of commanders to draw on the funds should they become 
quickly engaged in conflict somewhere else could lead to prolonged consequences. 
Commanders should have access to CERP upon deployment to any low-intensity or post-
conflict environment. 
Given that the availability of CERP funds should be maintained beyond the 
completion of the current conflicts, education should also be expounded upon and 
104 
 
continued. Great care should be taken to make certain classes are not fashioned to simply 
check a block for pre-deployment training. Rather concepts and lessons learned should be 
presented and tested to guarantee a commander’s proficiency in spending large amounts 
of money to most effectively sway support. As mentioned previously, the degree to 
which reconstruction can influence violence is a science, not an art. 
D. POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The next logical step for this research is to field test the model. Implementation of 
the model into an area of operations after full note of all contributing factors has been 
taken and implemented, would likely yield supporting results because the model is a 
reflection of the environment. Such operationalization would generate output that would 
more directly enable further and more detailed analysis on the contribution of CERP 
toward the influence of insurgency.  
Additionally, similar research conducted in other provinces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at the village level would provide a better overall picture of the contribution 
of CERP to violence. Each province is unique in terms of the methods used to control 
violence, the level of violence, and the methods guiding the utilization of CERP. The 
accuracy of these assessments is dependent upon the availability and validity of data, 
which requires close cooperation with counterinsurgent forces currently operating in the 
desired regions. It is important that data are collected at the village or neighborhood level 
to provide the most reliable and pragmatic results.  
The wider availability of data and research of additional province will enable the 
identification of regional trends—which can then be further analyzed for theater wide 
adjustments and modifications. The relationship between reconstruction and violence is 
context (regionally) interdependent; however, broad analysis would more appropriately 
contribute to identification of what the purpose of CERP should be. 
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E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since the beginning of U.S. participation in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
thousands of Americans, international force and indigenous personnel have been killed. 
Billions of dollars have been spent on reconstruction and the strength of the U.S. military 
apparatus has been significantly stressed. Given the reality of the situation, the goal of 
this research is not so much to determine how the U.S. could have better conducted 
reconstruction. Rather, it is to provide a useful framework for the drawing of prescriptive 
implications on how future reconstruction can be used to maximize return on the 
investment. If this model contributes to the lessening of these realities to even a minimal 
extent, it will be considered a success. This research shows that, in the At Tameem 
province, it can. 
This research contains a cautionary note for policy makers. The purpose of CERP 
should immediately be reassessed at the highest levels. If we’re going to spend CERP, it 
should be spent correctly. Otherwise, reconstruction should be left to the experts and 
CERP should not be spent for reconstruction at all, because it is possible more harm can 
be created than good. Upon determination of the purpose of CERP, adjustments for 
allocation should follow in kind.  
Finally, for commanders this research provides significant opportunity for 
localization. The framework can easily accommodate localized data and specification to 
provide valuable insight on area specific relationships between reconstruction and 
violence. The results will not fail to engender unique perspective. The realities of the 
current situation require that these perspectives not be overlooked.  
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VILLAGE ASSESSMENT FORM 
 AREA GREEN AMBER RED BLACK 
GOVERNMENTAL FOOD 









SYSTEM EXISTS, BUT 





FOOD IS FRESH AND 100% 
CONSUMABLE 
MOST OF THE FOOD IS 
FRESH AND 
CONSUMABLE 
SOME OF THE FOOD 
IS CONSUMABLE, 
MOST IS SPOILED 
FOOD IS COMPLETELY 
SPOILED AND CANNOT 
BE CONSUMED 
      
WATER DISTRIBUTION 












TESTED AS CLEAN OR 
TOLD BY LOCALS CLEAN 
APPEARS CLEAN, NO 
SMELL 




      
100% VILLAGE PEOPLE 
HAVE SHELTER 
GREATER THAN 75% 
VILLAGE PEOPLE 
HAVE SHELTER 
GREATER THAN 50% 
VILLAGE PEOPLE 
HAVE SHELTER 
LESS THAN 50% 
VILLAGE PEOPLE HAVE 
SHELTER 
HOUSING RESIDENCES ARE 
STRUCTURALLY SOUND 
AND OFFER PROTECTION 














      
POWER SYSTEM WORKS; 
BLACK OUTS ARE 
PLANNED 
POWER SYSTEM 
WORKS; BLACK OUTS 
UNPLANNED 




ELECTRIC LINES ARE UP 
100%, NO DAMAGE, NO 
ENERGY LOSS 
ELECTRIC LINES ARE 
UP AT LEAST 50%, 




GREATER THAN 50% 
OF ELECTRIC LINES 
DOWN ; MAJORITY OF 
LINES 
DETERIORATED; 
POWER LOSS SEEN 
ELECTRIC LINES ARE 
ALL DOWN, HOT 
WIRES; POWER LOSS POWER 
POWER GRID STATION 
INTACT; SECUREABLE 








POWER GRID STATION 
STRIPPED; DESTROYED 










AND INTACT; EQUIPMENT 
AVAILABLE AND 
USEABLE 
POLICE WORKING AT 
LEAST 50%; BLDG 
SECURABLE BUT 
DAMAGED; 
EQUIPMENT AT LEAST 
50% AVAILABLE AND 
USEABLE 
POLICE WORKING AT 
UNDER 50% 
STRENGTH; BLDG 
DAMAGED; OVER 50% 
OF EQUIPMENT NOT 
USABLE 
POLICE ARE NOT 





FIRE SYSTEM IS IN PLACE, 
WORKING; BLDG 
SECURABLE AND INTACT; 
EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE 
AND USEABLE 




EQUIPMENT AT LEAST 
50% AVAILABLE AND 
USEABLE 
FIRE SYSTEM IS NOT 
ORGANIZED, NOT 
FORMAL; NO SET 
BLDG; LESS THAN 
50% EQUIPMENT 
AVAILABLE 
NO FIRE SYSTEM 
BUILT; NO BLDG; NO 
EQUIPMENT 
CRIME IN AREA IS NOT 
ISSUE; JAIL EXISTS, 
CLEAN AND USEABLE; 




PROACTIVE; JAIL IS 
USEABLE; MAJORITY 









PROBLEM; NO JAIL; 
LOCALS DO NOT 
FOLLOW AUTHORITY 
MAJOR ROUTES INTO 
AREA ARE 100% 
PASSABLE; NO PIRATING 
OR CORRUPTION 










MAJOR ROUTES INTO 




UXO'S/IED'S ARE NOT AN 
ISSUE; AREA SWEPT 
UXO'S/IED'S HAVE 
BEEN FOUND, MARKED 
AND REMOVED; NO 
CONTINUOUS THREAT 
UXO'S/IED'S CAN 




UXO'S/IED'S ARE A 
CONTINUOUS 
OCCURANCE; EFFECT 
DAILY LIFE AND 
OPERATIONS 
      
MEDICAL BUILDING 




















RUNNING AND EFFICIENT; 




EXISTS; ONE VEHICLE; 
PERSONNEL MAN THE 
TRUCK MAY OR MAY 
NOT BE TRAINED 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICE IS NOT IN 
PLACE; VEHICLE 
EXISTS; NO TRAINED 
PERSONNEL 
NO EMERGENCY 
SERVICE; NO VEHICLE; 
NO PERSONNEL 
HEALTH SERVICES 
MEDICAL BUILDING IS 
SUFFICIENTLY STAFFED 
WITH 100% TRAINED 
PERSONNEL 
MEDICAL BUILDING IS 
STAFFED WITH OVER 
50% TRAINED 
PERSONNEL 
MEDICAL BUILDING IS 
STAFFED WITH LESS 
THAN 50% TRAINED 
PERSONNEL 
MEDICAL BUILDING IS 
UNDERMANNED AND 
UNDERTRAINED 













TRASH PUT IN AN AREA 
THAT IS NOT A HEALTH 
ISSUE 
NOT KNOWN WHERE 
TRASH IS DUMPED 
TRASH IS 
CONSOLIDATED IN A 
PLACE THAT COULD 
BE A HEALTH ISSUE 
TRASH IS 
CONSOLIDATED IN A 
PLACE THAT IS A 
HEALTH ISSUE 
TRASH 
PUBLIC FACILITIES DO 
NOT HAVE A TRASH 
PROBLEM 
PUBLIC FACILITIES DO 




HAVE TO REMOVE 
THEIR OWN TRASH 
PUBLIC FACILITIES 
HAVE TRASH; NOT 
REMOVED 










EXISTS BUT BROKEN 




NO SEWAGE SEEN, OR 
SMELT 
NO SWEAGE SEEN, 
CAN BE SMELT-
SYSTEM BROKEN 
SWEAGE SEEN AND 
SMELT-SYSTEM 
BROKEN 
RAW SEWAGE AND 
SMELL WOULD BE A 
HEALTH ISSUE 
PUBLIC FACILITIES WORK 
IN 100% OF BLDGS 
PUBLIC FACILITIES 
WORK IN AT LEAST 
50% OF BLDGS 
PUBLIC FACILITIES 
EXIST, WORK IN LESS 
THAN 50% OF BLDGS 
PUBLIC FACILITIES DO 
NOT EXIST, NO 
WORKING SEWER 
      
ROADS 
MINIMUM OF PAVED 
ROAD; CAN BE 
UPGRADED, NO DAMAGE 
OR POTHOLES 
ROAD PAVED OR 
UNPAVED; POTHOLES 
OR DAMAGE THAT 








ROAD IS NOT 
TRAFFICABLE 
      
BRIDGES 
BRIDGE IS TRAFFICABLE; 
NO VISIBLE DAMAGE 
BRIDGE IS 
TRAFFICABLE; 
DAMAGE TO SPANS, 
NOT SUPPORTS 
BRIDGE IS NOT 
TRAFFICABLE;  
DAMAGE TO BOTH 
SPANS AND 
SUPPORTS 
BRIDGE IS NOT 
PASSABLE 
      














EQUIPMENT IN BUILDING 








FOR LESS THAN 50% 
OF STUDENTS 
NO EQUIPMENT TO 
SUPPORT STUDENTS 
SCHOOLS 
100% OF STUDENTS HAVE 
ADEQUATE SCHOOL 
SUPPLIES 








NO STUDENTS HAVE 
SCHOOL SUPPLIES 
      
LAND LINE TELEPHONE 
WORKS, EQUIPMENT IS 
AVAILABLE, RELIABLE IN 
ALL PUBLIC FACILITIES 
LAND LINE HOOKUPS 
ARE IN PUBLIC 
FACILITIES; 
EQUIPMENT IS OVER 
50%; FAIRLY RELIABLE 
LAND LINE HOOKUPS 
ARE IN FACILITIES; 
EQUIPMENT IS IN 
LESS THAN 50%; NOT 
RELIABLE 
NO LAND LINE 
HOOKUPS IN 
FACILITIES; SYSTEM 
DOES NOT WORK 
COMMUNICATION 
ALL THREE FORMS OF 
MEDIA: RADIO, TV, 
NEWSPAPER EXIST AND 
ARE RUNNING 
ONE FORM OF MEDIA 
EXISTS AND IS 
RUNNING 
ONE FORM OF MEDIA 
EXISTS BUT IS NOT 
RUNNING 
NO FORMS OF MEDIA 
EXIST 
       
COMMUNITY LEADERS 
NOT HOSTILE; RELIGIOUS 
CENTERS ARE INTACT; 











ARE DAMAGED, NOT 
SECURABLE; 





DON'T TRUST IA/CF 










NO ETHNIC TENSION, ALL 
ONE COMMUNITY 
DISTINCT ETHNIC 
GROUPS WITHIN AO; 
WILL SUPPORT IF 
IMPROVING OR FIXING 
IS EQUAL TO ALL 
DISTINCT ETHNIC 
GROUPS WITHIN AO; 




OCCURS; ONE GROUP 





GROUPS CAN NOT BE EQUAL 
TO ALL GROUPS 
TENSION 
EMPLOYMENT IS OVER 
50% 
EMPLOYMENT IS 
UNDER 50%; ABLE TO 
WORK 
EMPLOIYMENT IS 
UNDER 50%; UNABLE 
TO WORK 
EMPLOYMENT IS AN 








AND CONCERNED AT 
BDE LEVEL 
PARAMILITARY 
THREAT BRIEFED AND 





GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ 
(LOCAL, PROVINCIAL AND 
NATIONAL) 




GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ 
(LOCAL, PROVINCIAL 
AND/OR NATIONAL) 
MAJORITY OF THE 
POPULATION DOES 







DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE ESTABLISHED 




SUPPORTS THE IRAQI 
ARMY 
MAJORITY OF THE 
POPULATION 
SUPPORTS THE IRAQI 
ARMY 
MAJORITY OF THE 
POPULATION DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE 
IRAQI ARMY 
ENTIRE POPULATION 
DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE IRAQI ARMY 
ENTIRE POPULATION 
SUPPORTS THE IRAQI 
POLICE 
MAJORITY OF THE 
POPULATION 
SUPPORTS THE IRAQI 
POLICE 
MAJORITY OF THE 
POPULATION DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE 
IRAQI POLICE 
ENTIRE POPULATION 
DOES NOT SUPPORT 




       
NAME OF VILLAGE:                   
# HOUSES:   PRINTED NAME AND DATE OF ASSESSOR: 
# PEOPLE:   
RELIGIOUS %:                          
(% SUNNI/SHIA, ETC)   
  
ETHNICITY %:                           
(% ARAB/ KURD/ TURK, 
ETC) 
  SIGNATURE OF ASSESSOR: 
OCCUPATION %:                     
(% FARMERS/ IA/ 
BANKERS, ETC) 
    
IMPORTANT PEOPLE AND 
LOCATION OF HOUSE 
(GRID): 
  
# SCHOOLS:       
# CLINICS:       
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APPENDIX B:  DV/IV DIAGRAMS 
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